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COMMENTS
Agent Orange and the Government Contract
Defense: Are Military Manufacturers
Immune from Products Liability?
Courts are unwilling to impose products liability on gov-
ernment contractors, particularly during wartime. If a contrac-
tor nonnegligently performs a government contract according
to specifications provided by the government, then it will be
absolved from liability to third parties. This Comment dis-
cusses the elements of, and prudential justifications for, this
"government contract defense." After examining the relation-
ship between the government contract defense and the doctrine
of sovereign immunity, the Comment concludes that the de-
fense is necessary to preserve the government's discretionary
authority over military procurement.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In May 1975, President Gerald Ford declared the official end
of the American involvement in the Vietnam War.' Yet seven years
1. Proclamation No. 4373, 40 Fed. Reg. 20,257 (1975); see also The End of an Era,
NEWSWEEK, May 5, 1975, at 20, 20 ("[T~he War in Vietnam. .. 'is finished as far as America
is concerned.' ").
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later, the United States remains plagued by the tragic memory of
the Vietnam experience. The sting of war is still felt by those who
served in Vietnam; many carry both physical and psychological
scars from their battlefield encounters. With each passing year,
more veterans fall victim to a war that has ended for America, but
rages on anew in the minds and bodies of its survivors. The source
of the problem is not the enemy, but ourselves; a chemical used by
the United States during the war, rather than Viet Cong mortar
fire, is causing the injuries.
The chemical culprit is a herbicide called Agent Orange.' In
January 1962, United States military forces began spraying Agent
Orange on the forests of Vietnam to eliminate the enemy's shelter
and food supply." Eight years later, the government terminated the
defoliation program in response to growing fears that the herbicide
was toxic.' By that time, the spraying had exposed millions of
American servicemen to Agent Orange.' Unfortunately, the medi-
cal and scientific admonitions proved prophetic, as subsequent re-
search has demonstrated that Agent Orange is a lethal toxin.
2. See Comment, Agent Orange as a Problem of Law and Policy, 77 Nw. U.L. REv. 48,
48 n.5 (1982).
3. Herbicides are chemicals used to kill weeds and plants. L. CASARMTr & J. DOULL,
TOXICOLOGY 408, 437 (1975). Herbicides can be manufactured in different concentrations
and with a varying number of chlorophenoxy groups, the active ingredients in Agent Or-
ange. Id. at 437-38. Agent Orange is considered highly toxic due to the presence of 2, 3, 7, 8-
tetrachloro-dibenzo-p-dioxon, commonly known as dioxon. In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
Liab. Litig. (Agent Orange II1), 635 F.2d 987, 989 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom.
Chapman v. Dow Chem. Co., 454 U.S. 1128 (1981). Although the history of the development
and use of Agent Orange is beyond the scope of this Comment, an excellent review is availa-
ble in Meyers, Soldier of Orange: The Administrative, Diplomatic, Legislative and Liti-
gatory Impact of Herbicide Agent Orange in South Vietnam, 8 EN'rL. Aiw. 159, 160-61
(1979), and Commentary, Agent Orange: Government Responsibility for the Military Use
of Phenoxy Herbicides, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 137 (1982).
4. See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
5. See Meyers, supra note 3, at 164-69.
6. "Some (veterans] claim to have been directly sprayed with Agent Orange"; others
believe that their exposure was due to "being transported through sprayed areas . . . or
ingesting water or food contaminated with the herbicide; and still others claim exposure
during the transportation and handling of Agent Orange or its containers." In re "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig. (Agent Orange I), 506 F. Supp. 762, 776 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 635
F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Chapman v. Dow Chem. Co., 454 U.S. 1128
(1981). The number of servicemen exposed to the herbicide is estimated at 2.4 million.
Agent Orange III, 635 F.2d 987, 989 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Chapman v. Dow
Chem. Co., 454 U.S. 1128 (1981); see Yannacone, Kavenagh & Searcy, Agent Orange Litiga-
tion, 1982 TRIMAL 44 [hereinafter cited as Yannacone].
7. See Meyers, supra note 3, at 180-83. Agent Orange is now believed to be carcinogenic
(i.e., causes cancer), teratogenic (i.e., interferes with normal fetal growth processes), muta-
genic (i.e., causes a change in the sequence of base pairs in the chromosomal DNA mole-
cule), fetotoxic (i.e., toxic to the fetus in utero), and the cause of numerous systemic disor-
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Who is to blame for the calamitous consequences of the Agent
Orange operation? At least one lawsuit, In re "Agent Orange"
Product Liability Litigation (Agent Orange I),' seeks to blame the
chemical companies who manufactured the herbicide. Among the
grounds for the plaintiffs's suit against the chemical companies is
products liability.10 The manufacturers rely on the government
ders. See Commentary, supra note 3, at 145-49.
8. 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub
nom. Chapman v. Dow Chem. Co., 454 U.S. 1128 (1981). For purposes of clarity, this deci-
sion hereinafter will be referred to as "Agent Orange I"; the subsequent district court opin-
ion, 534 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), will be referred to as "Agent Orange H"; and the
court of appeals' decision, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), will be referred to as "Agent Orange
III.II
Several periodicals have reported on the Agent Orange controversy. See, e.g., Davis,
Military Products Liability, TRIAL, July 1977, at 48; Griffin, Poisoned Patriotism, 1982 STU-
DENT LAW. 23; Payne, Beyond Vietnam, Beyond Politics, Beyond Causes .. , 6 BAms'rma
10 (1977); Toback, A Case of Mistaken Liability: The Government Contractor's Liability
for Injuries Incurred by Members of the Armed Forces, 13 PUB. CONT. L.J. 74 (1982); Yan-
nacone, supra note 6, at 45; Comment, supra note 2; Comment, Agent Orange Products
Liability Suits for Defective Design, 48 U. Cm. L. REV. 1030 (1981); 7 AM. J.L. & MED. 46
(1981); 1981 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1256.
The Agent Orange controversy is but one of a number of current cases involving the
potential liability of a government contractor for injuries caused by the manufacture of a
product for the government. Other disputes center around the domestic use of herbicides,
see cases cited in Nat'l L.J., July 26, 1982, at 1, col. 1, or asbestos, see cases cited in Oshin-
sky, Insurance Coverage For Asbestos Tort Liability Litigation, 5 J. PROD. LIAB. 69 (1982).
In these cases, the government usually has specified the use of a material or the manufac-
ture of a product that causes injury to the ultimate user. At the time they entered the
contract, the government and the contractor often possessed little or no information indicat-
ing that the materials or finished product would be hazardous. For an account of the events
leading to the recognition of asbestos as an occupational hazard, see Borel v. Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); P.
BRODEUR, EXPENDABLE AMERICANS (1974).
9. Plaintiffs include "Vietnam veterans, their spouses, their parents, and their chil-
dren." Agent Orange I, 506 F. Supp. at 769.
10. Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts details the elements of products
liability-
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
Strict products liability does not mean that the seller is an insurer for all harm resulting
from the use of its product, but merely that the seller is liable to an injured user or con-
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contract defense to refute the plaintiffs' claims; they contend that
because the government controlled and dictated the design and
manufacture of Agent Orange, it therefore either warranted the
chemical's safety or immunized the manufacturers of Agent Or-
ange from liability.11 Although the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York recognized that the contractors
in Agent Orange I are protected by the government contract de-
fense, 2 it refused to grant the chemical companies a summary
judgment because too many material facts relevant to the compa-
nies' defense remain unresolved.' 3
sumer if its product is "unreasonably dangerous," however careful the seller was in produc-
ing it. See Simien v. S.S. Kresge Co., 566 F.2d 551, 557 (5th Cir. 1978); Stueve v. American
Honda Motors Co., 457 F. Supp. 740, 753 (D. Kan. 1978); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20
Cal. 3d 725, 733, 575 P.2d 1162, 1166, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 384 (1978). An injured consumer or
user may recover under products liability for defective design, Ford v. Harnischfeger Corp.,
365 F. Supp. 602, 606 (E.D. Pa. 1973); defective manufacture, Neofes v. Robertshaw Con-
trols Co., 409 F. Supp. 1376, 1379-80 (S.D. Ind. 1976) (manufacturer of component part
found liable under strict liability); or inadequate warning of the product's danger, LaBelle v.
McCauley Indus. Corp., 649 F.2d 46, 55 (1st Cir. 1981); Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498
F.2d 1264, 1273-78 (5th Cir. 1974).
Other grounds for the plaintiffs' suit in Agent Orange include negligence, breach of
warranty, and nuisance. Agent Orange 1, 506 F. Supp. at 769.
11. Agent Orange , 506 F. Supp. at 792-97.
12. Id. at 792-95.
13. Id. at 795-96. The history of the Agent Orange litigation is complex. For the events
precipitating the first lawsuit, see Yannacone, supra note 6. The original plaintiffs com-
menced action in the United States District Courts for the Northern District of Illinois and
for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York. Agent Orange II, 635 F.2d at 988. The
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ordered all Agent Orange cases consolidated and
transferred to the Eastern District of New York. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.,
No. 381 (J.P.M.D.L. Jan. 29, 1980). All subsequent plaintiffs filed their claims in this court.
The district court initially dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, including "a claim for injunc-
tive relief against further manufacture of certain herbicides." 635 F.2d at 989 & n.2. The
plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint "asserting causes of action under the federal
common law." Id. at 989. Before the court could consider the defendants' motion to dismiss
the amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the "plaintiffs proffered a
third amended complaint." Id. The district court entertained the defendants' previous mo-
tion to dismiss, but denied the request.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding
that the plaintiffs lacked federal question jurisdiction because a federal common-law rule of
products liability did not apply to this suit. The court of appeals found the plaintiffs' fed-
eral common-law claims deficient on three grounds: 1) there exists no substantial federal
interest in the outcome of the litigation; 2) the application of state law would not deleteri-
ously affect federal interests; and 3) the application of federal common law would adversely
affect state interests. Id. at 993-95; see 12 CuM. L. REv. 183 (1981).
In the aftermath of the Second Circuit's opinion, the district court has (1) clarified the
validity and relevancy of the government contract defense, Agent Orange I, 506 F. Supp. at
792-95; (2) ruled that under the Feres doctrine, infra note 17, neither plaintiffs nor defen-
dants may sue, implead, or seek indemnification from the United States for injuries caused
by Agent Orange, 506 F. Supp. at 774-81; and (3) found that the plaintiffs had satisfied the
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The government contract defense is based on "considerations
of fairness and public policy":1 ' First, the contractor is deemed to
be merely an extension of the government; and second, it is unfair
and inequitable to hold a contractor liable for the tortious conduct
of the government.16 The focal point of the government contract
defense is the government's discretionary decision to order the de-
sign, manufacture, or use of the product in question.
Under the government contract defense, a government con-
tractor is liable for negligently performing his job. But the contrac-
tor is not liable, even under products liability, if he follows the
dictates of the contract and there are exigent circumstances justi-
fying the suspension of liability. Courts are unwilling to impose
products liability on a contractor who fills a government wartime
order because it would either impede contractor participation in
the war effort or impair government discretionary authority over
military procurement.16 The realities of this defense are particu-
larly disturbing in a case such as Agent Orange, in which the de-
nial of products liability relief probably spells the end of any legal
action against the chemical companies for herbicide-related
injuries.17
requirements of FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) for a class action, 506 F. Supp. at 787-91. Due to
the complexity of the case, the district court has decided to have separate trials for some of
the issues, including the government contract defense, liability under "negligence, product
liability, and general causation," and the individual damages claims. Id. at 785-86.
14. Agent Orange 1, 506 F. Supp. at 793.
15. Toback, supra note 8, at 92.
16. See infra notes 65-175 and accompanying text.
17. Hundreds of thousands of veterans already are precluded from suing the chemical
companies in state courts because the relevant statutes of limitations have lapsed. See Com-
ment, supra note 2, at 58 n.67. The plaintiffs' plight becomes even more troubling because
they have no legal recourse against the United States. Agent Orange 1, 506 F. Supp. at 781.
This result is dictated by section 2680(j) of the Federal Tort Claims Act and the Feres
doctrine, which prevent members of the armed forces from suing the United States for inju-
ries suffered incident to, or arising out of, military service. See Feres v. United States, 340
U.S. 135, 146 (1950); Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110,
2401, 2404, 2411-2412, 2671-2680 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The Feres Court cited several
reasons for the doctrine, some of which remain persuasive today. First, the "distinctively
federal" nature of the relationship between soldiers and the government means that military
personnel should not be subject to variations in state law when seeking relief. 340 U.S. at
143. Second, claims against the government are unnecessary because there already exists a
comprehensive system for compensating military personnel under the Veterans' Benefits
Act, 38 U.S.C. § 355 (1976). 340 U.S. at 145. But cf. United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110,
113 (1954) (availability of veterans' benefits does not preclude suit against government).
Third, suits against the government are barred because of the need for military discipline,
which is fostered by preventing a soldier from questioning the legitimacy of an order. See,
e.g., Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977); United States v.
Brown, 348 U.S. at 112. The courts have used the Feres doctrine to prevent a government
19821
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This Comment examines the basis for suspending products li-
ability during wartime and posits the relevant legal standard to be
applied by a court in lawsuits against government contractors. Part
II explores the elements of the government contract defense. Part
III is a prudential and philosophical analysis of the need and ratio-
nale for the government contract defense during wartime. Whether
the defendant chemical companies should have produced Agent
Orange is beyond the scope of this Comment.
II. ELEMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACT DEFENSE
In a proper case, the government contract defense provides a
contractor with a "complete defense" to claims sounding in negli-
gence, warranty, or products liability. 8 The government contractor
contractor from impleading the United States as a third-party defendant liable for indemni-
fication or contribution. See, e.g., Agent Orange I, 506 F. Supp. at 781 (relying on Stencel
Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977)). For an excellent explanation of the
"incident to service" limitation of the Feres doctrine, see Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d
1007 (5th Cir. 1980).
Despite this gloomy outlook, the plaintiffs can receive some compensation for their inju-
ries if Congress passes a special bill to provide the aggrieved parties with relief in excess of
current military benefits. See Meyers, supra note 3, at 185-86; infra note 103; cf. Appleson,
A-Test Vets, Families Fight Cancer and U.S. Government, 68 A.B.A. J. 26, 29 (1982) (vet-
erans exposed to nuclear radiation during military testing seek congressional aid).
18. Casabianca v. Casabianca, 104 Misc. 2d 348, 350, 428 N.Y.S.2d 400, 402 (Sup. Ct.
1980) (warranty), cited with approval in Agent Orange 1, 506 F. Supp. at 794; see, e.g.,
Hunt v. Blasius, 55 Ill. App. 3d 14, 370 N.E.2d 617 (1977) (warranty), aff'd, 74 II. 2d 203,
384 N.E.2d 368 (1978); Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J. Super. 1, 364 A.2d 43 (Law Div.
1976) (negligence and strict liability), afl'd, 154 N.J. Super. 407, 381 A.2d 805 (App. Div.
1977), certification denied, 75 N.J. 616, 384 A.2d 846 (1978).
This defense does not include assumption of risk. Assumption of risk may be express or
implied. Express assumption of risk requires that the plaintiff expressly agree in advance
"to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him, and to take his chances of
injury from a known risk arising from what the defendant is to do or leave undone." W.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 68, at 440 (4th ed. 1971). The plaintiff's consent must be the
result of free and open bargaining between the parties, and the agreement must be consis-
tent with public policy. Id. at 444. Implied assumption of risk requires that "the plaintiff
voluntarily [enter] into some relation with the defendant, with knowledge that the defen-
dant will not protect him against the risk." Id. at 440.
Conceivably, a soldier who enlists in the armed services is assuming a risk of harm; the
danger is self-evident. The assumption of risk doctrine requires, however, that the injured
party appreciate the risk presented by the specific situation or product. For example, in
Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), the manu-
facturer of a defective airship argued that a serviceman who volunteered for flight duty not
required of other Navy personnel, and who received higher compensation to perform the
work, had assumed the risk of his subsequent injury. The facts, however, did not demon-
strate that the injured serviceman knew of the "advanced design" and "limited safety" fea-
tures of his airship. Id. at 451. Therefore, the court rejected the manufacturer's assumption
of risk argument because, as a matter of law, the serviceman neither knew nor appreciated
the risks of the airship. Id. In the context of this Comment, a soldier, to have assumed the
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must raise this affirmative defense and prove each of its ele-
ments. 9 Whether the contractor is absolved from liability, how-
ever, will depend on how the court characterizes the contract's
specifications,20 and the amount of discretionary authority the con-
tract grants the contractor."1
Agent Orange II delineated three elements of the government
contract defense: (1) government-established contract specifica-
tions; (2) contractor compliance in all material respects with the
specifications; and (3) government knowledge at least equal to the
contractor's knowledge about the hazards of the finished product.
22
The following section of this Comment explains each of these ele-
ments and how they work to protect government contractors from
liability to third parties.
A. Government-Established Specifications
The government contract defense requires at the outset that
the govenment establish the specifications for the procured prod-
risk of exposure to Agent Orange, must have had knowledge of its dangers, and have ex-
pressly or impliedly agreed to encounter them.
19. Agent Orange II, 534 F. Supp. at 1055-56.
20. See infra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
21. A relationship exists between the extent of a contractor's discretion and the availa-
bility of the government contract defense. Under the defense, the government contractor is
required to follow closely the contract's specifications. A contractor who elects to substitute
materials or change a procedure assumes the responsibility for the consequences of his act.
Austin Co. v. United States, 314 F.2d 518 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 830 (1963); see
Cameo Bronze, Inc., 73-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 10,135, at 47,653 (1973); Polyphase Contracting
Corp., 68-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 6759, at 31,259 (1968); Aerodex, Inc., 1962 B.C.A. (CCH) 3492,
at 17,822, rev'd on other grounds, 417 F.2d 1361 (Ct. Cl. 1969); see also infra notes 30-31
and accompanying text.
The scope of the government contract defense becomes "more restricted" as the lati-
tude afforded the contractor expands. Agent Orange II, 534 F. Supp. at 1056. This result is
not surprising for two reasons. First, the government impliedly warrants that its specifica-
tions, not the contractor's rendition, are adequate and, if followed, will produce a satisfac-
tory finished product. United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, 137 (1918); J.L. Simmons Co.
v. United States, 412 F.2d 1360, 1363 & n.4, 1382 (Ct. Cl. 1969). For a discussion of the
implied warranty attached to the government's specifications, see infra notes 25-34 and ac-
companying text. Second, sovereign immunity "extends" to the contractor if he is doing
"government work under government direction." Converse v. Portsmouth Cotton Oil Ref.
Corp., 281 F. 981, 986 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 260 U.S. 724 (1922); see, e.g., York Cove Corp.
v. United States, 317 F. Supp. 799 (E.D. Va. 1970). This immunity is less likely to protect a
contractor who exceeds the boundaries of his authority under the contract, Yearsley v. W.A.
Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 20-21 (1940), cited with approval in Agent Orange I, 506 F.
Supp. at 793, or whose actions cause injuries that are not incidental to, or an avoidable
consequence of, performing the contract. Converse v. Portsmouth Cotton Oil Ref. Corp., 281
F. at 984; Schrader v. Hercules, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 159, 161 (W.D. Va. 1980).
22. Agent Orange II, 534 F. Supp. at 1055.
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uct 25 Specifications typically prescribe the technical requirements
for a material, product, or service, including the inspection, assem-
bly, and testing procedures that the contractor must follow. 4 The
government has exclusive control over the design, use, and applica-
tion of the products it procures;2 5 for this reason, courts and ad-
ministrative agencies have held that the government impliedly
warrants that compliance with its specifications will produce a sat-
isfactory product.
2e
Contract plans can generally be classified as one of three vari-
"217 rcas 25 nceties: "design, "purchase description, or "performance"29
23. The government's authority to contract is either conferred by statute or derived
from powers that are incident to national sovereignty. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
Several statutes and regulations govern military procurement. See, e.g., Armed Services
Procurement Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2314 (1976); Wunderlich Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-322
(1976); Armed Services Procurement Regulations, 32 C.F.R. § 1 (1981); see also Laurie, Ne-
gotiated Contracts with the Armed Forces, 30 MICH. ST. B.J. 11 (1951).
24. W. KEYES, KEYES ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF PROCUREMENT LAW S-30 (2d ed.
1982).
25. J.L. Simmons Co. v. United States, 412 F.2d 1360, 1362 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (design speci-
fications); Aerodex, Inc., 1962 B.C.A. (CCH) 3492, at 17,822, rev'd on other grounds, 417
F.2d 1361 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (purchase description specifications).
The government's exclusive control over, and knowledge about, its contract specifica-
tions may relieve a contractor from the need "to investigate for himself whether compliance
with the specifications would .. .produce the desired result." R.M. Hollingshead Corp. v.
United States, 111 F. Supp. 285, 286 (Ct. Cl. 1953); see also Agent Orange II, 534 F. Supp.
at 1055 (contractor's duty to notify government of superior knowledge "would not impose
upon a supplier any duty of testing that was not included in the specifications"); Seven
Sciences, Inc., 77-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 12,730, at 61,878 (1977) (contractor "was reasonable in
assuming, without inquiry, that the Government would furnish original [drawings]").
26. See United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132 (1918) (seminal case holding that im-
plied warranty attaches to government specifications); Poorvu v. United States, 420 F.2d
993 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (no time constraints on implied warranty); L.W. Foster Sportswear Co. v.
United States, 405 F.2d 1285 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (one government agency held responsible for
implied warranty created by another); Helene Curtis Indus. v. United States, 312 F.2d 774
(Ct. Cl. 1963) (government impliedly warrants method of production); Seven Sciences, Inc.,
77-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 112,730, at 61,877 (1977) (government impliedly warrants design specifi-
cations); Aerodex, Inc., 1962 B.C.A. (CCH) 3492, rev'd on other grounds, 417 F.2d 1361
(Ct. Cl. 1969) (government impliedly warrants purchase description specifications). For a
detailed account of the scope of the government's implied warranty of its contract's specifi-
cations, see Comment, The Scope and Limitations of the Implied Warranty on Federal
Government Design Specifications, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 409 (1979).
27. Design specifications "set forth precise measurements, tolerances, materials, in pro-
cess and finished product tests, quality control, inspection requirements, and other specific
information." W. KEYES, supra note 24, at S-31; see Aerodex, Inc., 1962 B.C.A. (CCH) 1
3492, at 17,822, rev'd on other grounds, 417 F.2d 1361 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
28. Purchase description specifications are not as detailed as design specifications; they
prescribe only "the technical requirements [e.g., manufacturer's model, part number, or
description] or desired performance characteristics of the supplies or services to be pro-
cured." W. KEYES, supra note 24, at P-38. Purchase description specifications can be as
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specifications. The government impliedly warrants its design s and
purchase description3 1 specifications, but does not warrant per-
formance specifications, which require the contractor to exercise a
considerable amount of discretion in achieving the government's
performance objective.3 2 The government breaches its implied war-
precise as the design specifications, for they can also include testing, packaging, and mark-
ing requirements. Purchase description specifications typically are used when formal gov-
ernment specifications that describe supplies and services are not required by law. Id.; see
Aerodex, Inc., 1962 B.C.A. (CCH) 3492, at 17,822, rev'd on other grounds, 417 F.2d 1361
(Ct. Cl. 1969).
29. Performance specifications state the desired performance characteristics for the
product to be manufactured, but do not prescribe the manner in which they are to be ac-
complished. The contractor is given discretion to achieve the government's design, engineer-
ing, or performance requirements. See Aerodex, Inc., 1962 B.C.A. (CCH) 3492, at 17,822,
rev'd on other grounds, 417 F.2d 1361 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
30. J.L. Simmons Co. v. United States, 412 F.2d 1360, 1363 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Blake Con-
str. Co., 73-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 9819, at 45,894 (1973).
A contractor must strictly comply with design specifications to avail itself of the govern-
ment's implied warranty. Seven Sciences, Inc., 77-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 12,730, at 61,876 (1977);
Blake Const. Co., 73-1 B.C.A. (CCH) $ 9819, at 45,895 (1973). Accordingly, a contractor who
is manufacturing a product pursuant to design specifications is not permitted to decide what
materials are equally satisfactory substitutes for those specified in its contract with the gov-
ernment. Seven Sciences, Inc., 77-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 12,730, at 61,876; Cameo Bronze, Inc.,
73-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 10,135, at 47,653 (1973); Blake Constr. Co., 73-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 9819,
at 45,896 (1973).
31. Monitor Plastics Co., 72-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 9626, at 44,971 (1972); Aerodex, Inc.,
1962 B.C.A. (CCH) 3492, at 17,822, rev'd on other grounds, 417 F.2d 1361 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
The government impliedly warrants the performance of a product manufactured pursu-
ant to purchase description specifications, even if the contractor substitutes one brand name
item for another. Aerodex, Inc., 1962 B.C.A. (CCH) 3492, at 17,822. A contractor must be
sure, however, that its replacement item is an acceptable substitute. Id. A contractor who
elects to manufacture a substitute product in-house should make certain that the substitute
is in fact the equal of the specified brand name product. Id. The contractor must, however,
supply the government with sufficient information about the substitute to enable the gov-
ernment to determine whether the substitute will meet the contract's requirements. Poly-
phase Contracting Corp., 68-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 6759, at 31,260 (1968). The government may
not reject substitute items because of minor differences in design, construction, or other
features that do not affect the suitability of the items for their intended use. Id.
32. John Thomason Press & Mfg. Co. v. United States, 57 Ct. Cl. 200, 209 (1922); Aer-
odex, Inc., 1962 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 3492, at 17,822.
The characterization of contract specifications is not always straightforward. Some con-
tracts contain a mixture of design, purchase description, and performance specifications.
See, e.g., Monitor Plastics Co., 72-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 9626 (1972); A.C. Hoyle Co., 71-2 B.C.A.
(CCH) 1 9137 (1971); Dynalectron Corp., 69-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 7595 (1969); Aerodex, Inc.,
1962 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 3492, at 17,822. Courts determine the predominant intent of the par-
ties before classifying these hybrid specifications. See Penguin Indus. v. United States, 530
F.2d 934, 937 (Ct. Cl. 1976). Each portion of the specifications is examined to determine
which party should assume responsibility. See, e.g., Santa Fe Eng'rs, Inc., 79-2 B.C.A.
(CCH) 1 14,083, at 69,275-76 (1979); In-Trol Div. of Aseeco Corp., 76-2 B.C.A. (CCH)
12,085, at 58,037 (1976); Monitor Plastics Co., 72-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 9626, at 44,971 (1972);
A.C. Hoyle Co., 71-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 9137, at 42,369 (1971); Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing
Co., 70-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 8303, at 38,572 (1970).
1982]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
ranty if it submits defective specifications to the contractor" or
withholds from the contractor material information that was not
reasonably available elsewhere. s4
33. Whether the contractor may refuse to perform the contract with inadequate specifi-
cations depends on both the seriousness of the government's breach and its impact on the
contractor's ability to perform. When the government submits defective specifications, a
contractor may refuse to perform its contract. G.W. Galloway Co., 77-2 B.C.A. (CCH)
12,640 (1977). Further, a contractor who attempts to comply with defective specifications is
entitled to recover damages from the government for its added costs. Hol-Gar Mfg. Co. v.
United States, 360 F.2d 634, 638 (Ct. Cl. 1966). A different situation exists when a contrac-
tor develops specifications that turn out to be defective; in this case, the contractor may not
recover damages for its additonal costs. Austin Co. v. United States, 314 F.2d 518, 520 (Ct.
Cl.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 830 (1963). But if the government approves of specifications
developed by the contractor, then the contractor may recover for additional work done
under the contract. Tranco Indus., 78-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 113,307, at 65,083 (1978); E.L. Cour-
nand & Co., 60-2 B.C.A. (CCH) V 2840, at 14,754, 14,761-64 (1960).
A contractor may refuse to perform a government contract if it is commercially impossi-
ble for it to comply with the contract specifications. See R.E.D.M. Corp. v. United States,
428 F.2d 1304 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Finast Metal Prods., Inc., 77-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 12,331, at
59,615 (1977). The contractor's lack of adequate finances is not a legally cognizable reason
for not performing. Continental Rubber Works, 80-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 14,754, at 72,828
(1980); see also Seven Sciences, Inc., 77-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 12,730, at 61,878 (1977) ("The
contractor may not simply assert that the item is not buildable, make little or no engineer-
ing effort, attempt to get the contractual requirements changed, and then abandon perform-
ance when the change is not forthcoming.") (quoting Brief for Government at 28).
34. H.N. Bailey & Assocs. v. United States, 449 F.2d 376 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
[T]he Government violates its contractual obligations if it permits the contractor
to. . . undertake a. . . [project] which the Government knows to be defective,
provided that the Government possesses knowledge which is vital to the success-
ful completion of the contract, and provided further that it is unreasonable to
expect the contractor to obtain that vital information from any other accessible
source. . . . [T]he corollary of [this rule] is that the Government is under no
duty to volunteer information in its files if the contractor can reasonably be ex-
pected to seek and obtain the facts elsewhere ....
Id. at 382-83; see Helene Curtis Indus. v. United States, 312 F.2d 774, 778 (Ct. Cl. 1963);
Continental Rubber Works, 80-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 14,754, at 72,830-31 (1980); LaPointe In-
dus., 78-2 B.C.A. (CCH) V 13,444, at 65,694-95 (1978); Bermite Div. of Whittaker Corp., 77-2
B.C.A. (CCH) 12,674, at 61,506 (1977); Santa Fe Eng'rs, Inc., 75-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 11,570,
at 55,244 (1975). By not disclosing its exclusively held knowledge, the government misleads
the contractor into a disastrous bargain. Midvale-Heppenstall Co., 65-1 B.C.A. (CCH)
4629, at 22,116 (1965).
The government is not, however, obligated to share with its contractors every piece of
information that it may have about the products it procures. Rather, the extent of required
disclosure depends on a number of factors, including "the state of the bidders' knowledge,
the significance of the particular information to the performance of the contract, the ease of
discovering the information from other sources, [and] the Government's understanding of
the importance of its information." Helene Curtis, 312 F.2d at 779 n.2.
The "superior knowledge" rule does not apply to the government's "general knowledge"
about specifications. Continental Rubber Works, 80-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 14,754, at 72,830
(1980). General knowledge is not held exclusively by the government and is, by definition,
available to the contractor. But the rule does apply in cases in which the contractor has a
duty to notify the government about defects in the specifications. Dynalectron Corp. v.
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B. Contractor Compliance with Government Specifications
The government contract defense requires as its second ele-
ment that the contractor prove actual compliance "in all material
respects"" with the requirements of the specifications.36 Compli-
ance is a question of fact that requires "a comparison of the gov-
ernment's specifications for the [procured product] with the char-
acteristics and quality of the product supplied. 3 7 A contractor's
performance is nonconforming "if the discrepancy between specifi-
cations and product [is] a material one."33 If the contractor com-
plied "in all material respects" with the government's plans, then
he is insulated from products liability even if the government's
specifications were defective.3
Courts have applied both negligence and strict liability stan-
dards to determine whether a contractor complied with the govern-
ment's specifications.40 When applying a negligence standard, a
court ascertains whether the contractor undertook to perform the
contract even though it knew or should have known that the gov-
ernment's specifications were defective," or whether it breached a
duty owed to a user or consumer. 4' Application of a negligence
United States, 518 F.2d 594 (Ct. Cl. 1975). A contractor who knows or should have known of
an obvious government error in the contract specifications is obligated to call it to the gov-
ernment's attention. Allied Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.2d 995, 999 (Ct. Cl.
1967). Failure to notify the government about such information could negate the govern-
ment's implied warranty. Anthony.M. Meyerstein, Inc. v. United States, 137 F. Supp. 427,
430-31 (Ct. Cl. 1956).
35. Agent Orange I, 534 F. Supp. at 1055.
36. See Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J. Super. 1, 364 A.2d 43 (Law Div. 1976),
aff'd, 154 N.J. Super. 407, 381 A.2d 805 (App. Div. 1977), certification denied, 75 N.J. 616,
394 A.2d 846 (1978). "A manufacturer is bound to comply with plans and specifications
provided to it by the Government in the production of military equipment. If it does it is
insulated from liability." Id. at 9, 364 A.2d at 47.
37. 534 F. Supp. at 1057.
38. Id.
39. Casabianca v. Casabianca, 104 Misc. 2d 348, 350, 428 N.Y.S.2d 400, 402 (Sup. Ct.
1980) (Army contractor that followed defective government specifications held not liable for
plaintiff's personal injuries).
40. Challoner v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 512 F.2d 77, 83 (5th Cir.) (applying strict
liability standard), vacated on other grounds, 423 U.S. 3 (1975); Foster v. Day & Zimmer-
mann, Inc., 502 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1974) (applying strict liability standard); Littlehale v. E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 268 F. Supp. 791, 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (applying negligence
standard), afl'd, 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967).
41. A contractor is not justified in relying on the government's specifications if he
knows or should have known of defects in the plans. See supra note 34.
42. A government contractor's duty to warn foreseeable users of its products was ad-
dressed in Littlehale v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 268 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
afl'd, 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967). During World War II, the War Department provided du
Pont, the contractor, with detailed specifications for the manufacture of explosives to be
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standard is puzzling, however, because manufacturers usually are
subjected to a more rigorous products liability standard.4 Under
this stricter standard, a court need only determine whether the
finished product was defective when it left the contractor's
control.
44
C. The Parties' Relative Knowledge of the Hazards
The "central question" 45 under the contract specification the-
ory is "whether the government [knows] as much as the [contrac-
tor]. . . about the hazardous aspects of [the procured] product."'46
A contractor can successfully plead the government contract de-
fense only if the government knows "as much as or more" than the
contractor about the potential hazards of the production process or
used solely by Army personnel "thoroughly trained in the dangers and use of blasting caps."
Littlehale, an untrained civilian employee, sustained injury when his misuse of a blasting
cap caused it to detonate prematurely. In his products liability suit against du Pont, Lit-
tlehale claimed that du Pont was negligent in failing to provide warnings (beyond those
required by the government) of the inherent dangers of the explosives. In affirming the dis-
trict court's dismissal of the lawsuits, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that the contractor's duty to warn extended only to foreseeable users of the
product. 380 F.2d at 276.
The Littlehale decision is somewhat confusing because the district court discussed the
relevance of products liability law, but never explained why products liability did not apply
under the facts of the case. See 268 F. Supp. at 864.
43. In Foster v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 502 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1974), a prematurely
exploding hand grenade seriously injured an Army ROTC recruit participating in a training
exercise. The soldier sued the manufacturers of the grenade for damages based on strict
liability. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision for the plaintiff, holding that there was sufficient evidence to allow the jury
to conclude that the grenade was defective when it left the manufacturer's possession.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reached the same result in
Challoner v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 512 F.2d 77 (5th Cir.), vacated on other grounds,
423 U.S. 3 (1975). In Challoner a prematurely exploding howitzer round seriously injured
one soldier and killed another while they were fighting the North Vietnamese in Cambodia.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that strict liability, rather than negli-
gence standards, applied in this case. 512 F.2d at 82-83; see also Paoletto v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 464 F.2d 976 (3d Cir. 1972) (manufacturer of aircraft built according to Army specifi-
cations strictly liable for wrongful death of passenger).
The negligence standard is still appropriate, however, when the relevant issue is
whether the contractor has exceeded his contractual authority. If the contractor properly
executes its contact, then there is no liability. See Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309
U.S. 18 (1940); infra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
44. "A strict liability case, unlike a negligence case, does not require that the defen-
dant's acts or omission be the cause of the defect. It is only necessary that the product be
defective when it leaves the [contractor's) control." Challoner v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc.,
512 F.2d 77, 83 (5th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 423 U.S. 3 (1975).
45. Agent Orange I, 534 F. Supp. at 1057.
46. Id.
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ultimate product.' 7 "If this knowledge level between supplier and
the [government] is at least in balance, the supplier is then
shielded by the government contract defense from liability for
damages resulting from use of a product supplied pursuant to and
in compliance with government contract specifications.' 8 If the
contractor's level of knowledge about the potential hazards of the
product is greater than the government's, then he is obligated to
share with the government his information and to issue warning
labels to apprise others of the danger."
This third element of the government contract defense mirrors
previous decisions" that determined liability on the basis of the
parties' relative level of knowledge about the specifications. A rea-
sonableness standard is applied to determine whether the contrac-
tor's reliance on the specifications is justifiable. The logic here is
that a contractor who knows or should have known that the speci-
fications are defective cannot reasonably rely on the contract's
specifications without first notifying the government of the defi-
ciencies and taking steps to eliminate the hazard. Industry stan-
dards,52 or the expertise of the contractor," serve as a barometer to
47. Id. at 1055 (emphasis added).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1057. "It is only if [the contractor] concealed or failed to disclose to the gov-
ernment information about [potential] hazards of which the government was ignorant that
[the contractor fails] to gain the protection of the government contract defense . . . ." Id.;
see Dynalectron Corp. v. United States, 518 F.2d 594 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Allied Contractors, Inc.
v. United States, 381 F.2d 995 (Ct. Cl. 1967); cf. supra text accompanying note 34.
50. See Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J. Super. 1, 364 A.2d 43 (Law Div. 1976),
afl'd, 154 N.J. Super. 407, 381 A.2d 805 (App. Div. 1977), certification denied, 75 N.J. 616,
394 A.2d 846 (1978). The "relative level of knowledge" test also is used in nongovernment,
commercial cases involving independent contractors. See Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d
373 (4th Cir. 1973); Orion Ins. Co. v. United Technologies, 502 F. Supp. 173 (E.D. Pa. 1980);
Davis v. Henderlong Lumber Co., 221 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Ind. 1963).
51. See Allied Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.2d 995, 999 (Ct. Cl. 1967);
Dynalectron Corp., 69-1 B.C.A. (CCH) V 7595 (1969), rev'd on other grounds, 518 F.2d 594
(1975). But see Barr v. Brezina Constr. Co., 464 F.2d 1141 (10th Cir. 1972) (contractor may
not recover if it knew of defects in specifications, yet completed the contract).
52. In Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J. Super. 1, 364 A.2d 43 (Law Div. 1976), afl'd,
154 N.J. Super. 407, 381 A.2d 805 (App. Div. 1977), certification denied, 75 N.J. 616, 394
A.2d 846 (1978), a contractor manufactured jeeps for the government without seatbelts. The
Army had ordered vehicles without seatbelts because it believed that seatbelts posed a
safety problem (by preventing immediate escape) and reduced the tactical efficiency of the
jeeps. 144 N.J. Super. at 4, 364 A.2d at 44. The plaintiff, who was injured when another
vehicle struck his jeep from the rear, brought suit against the contractor, alleging that it
should be held strictly liable because a jeep without seatbelts was a defective product. The
court disagreed and dismissed the case, observing that Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Stan-
dard No. 208, 49 C.F.R. § 571.7(c) (1968), "specifically exempts from compliance with
[seatbelt requirements] 'a Vehicle or item of equipment manufactured for, and sold directly
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determine whether the contractor's reliance is reasonable.
III. PRUDENTIAL ANALYSIS
If it is axiomatic in tort law that the breach of a duty to an-
other must be redressed by the offender or someone else deemed
responsible for compensating the injured party, then is it legally
and philosophically justifiable to preclude recovery under products
liability law because of the government contract defense? One
would think that a soldier deserves the maximum assistance of the
law in seeking redress for unexpected (and unnecessary) injuries
sustained while serving his country in war."' But while the reality
of "synthetic living" and man's dependency on manufacturers to
supply us with food, apparel, and drugs suggest manufacturer cul-
pability for consumer injuries,55 the unique policy considerations
underlying the government contract defense advise otherwise.
Conventional products liability law is inappropriate in the
to, the Armed Forces of the United States in conformity with contractual specifications."'
144 N.J. Super. at 6, 364 A.2d at 45.
Similarly, in Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1973), the defendant man-
ufactured a crane in accordance with plans and specifications supplied by the plaintiff's
employer. The defendant did not equip the crane with any bells or other warning devices
that would alert bystanders that the crane was in motion. In his complaint the plaintiff
alleged that his injuries were caused by the defendant's negligence in failing to equip the
crane properly. The court exonerated the manufacturer from liability, concluding that it
"acted reasonably in relying upon [the customer's] industrial expertise and following its
plans and specifications, especially since ... neither the National Safety Code nor the Oc-
cupational Health and Safety Act require warning devices on ... cranes such as the one
here in question." Id. at 375.
53. In Davis v. Henderlong Lumber Co., 221 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Ind. 1963), the plaintiff
sustained injuries when he inhaled toxic fumes that were not vented from his chemical
hood. The district court exonerated the independent contractors responsible for the con-
struction of the laboratory and the hood, because they "had neither the educational back-
ground or [sic] experience to question the plans submitted or modifications ordered by [the
customer] whose judgment on those matters could justifiably be taken." Id. at 135.
In Orion Ins. Co. v. United Technologies, 502 F. Supp. 173 (E.D. Pa. 1980), the repre-
sentative of a helicopter pilot's estate sued the manufacturer of a component of the helicop-
ter in which the pilot was killed, alleging that the manufacturer both defectively designed
and manufactured the part. In granting the contractor's motion to dismiss the strict liability
claim, the court noted that a manufacturer may reasonably rely on the specifications of a
third party who had "an established reputation" and "superior knowledge in the field." Id.
at 176; see also Helene Curtis Indus. v. United States, 313 F.2d 774, 778 (Ct. Cl. 1963)
(government had "special knowledge" that grinding chemicals would be necessary and did
not inform contractors of this fact).
54. See infra text accompanying note 179.
55. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 51 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Although
admittedly in another context, Justice Jackson provides the rationale for this Comment's
analysis: "the conditions of contemporary society and . . .the circumstances of the case"
dictate a result contrary to the traditional teachings of tort law. Id. at 49.
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government contract setting because it would either have a chilling
effect on a supplier's willingness to contract with the government
or it would substantially increase government procurement costs."
Both effects impair the government's discretionary authority over
military procurement and may be detrimental to the military ef-
fort.5 7 In particular, the application of products liability law in
wartime is philosophically inconsistent with the rules of war."
A. Doctrinal Justification for Products Liability
The underlying rationale for products liability is mul-
tifaceted.59 Two factors are relevant to this analysis. First, the pub-
lic has the right to expect a manufacturer to warrant the safety of
his product.6 0 This right is a consequence of the manufacturer's
superior knowledge of its product's qualities and capabilities. The
consumer's familiarity with a product will not relieve a manufac-
turer from liability for injuries caused by defects in the product;
therefore, the manufacturer has an incentive to adopt safety im-
56. See infra notes 65-77 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 105-75 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 183-98 and accompanying text.
59. As one commentator has noted:
(1) Manufacturers convey to the public a general sense of product quality
through the use of mass advertising and merchandising practices, causing con-
sumers to rely for their protection upon the skill and expertise of the manufac-
turing community.
(2) Consumers no longer have the ability to protect themselves adequately from
defective products due to the vast number and complexity of products which
must be "consumed" in order to function in modem society.
(3) Sellers are often in a better position than consumers to identify the potential
product risks, to determine the acceptable levels of such risks, and to confine the
risks within those levels.
(4) A majority of product accidents not caused by product abuse are probably
attributable to the negligent acts or omissions of manufacturers at some stage of
the manufacturing or marketing process, yet the difficulties of discovering and
proving this negligence are often practicably insurmountable.
(5) Negligence liability is generally insufficient to induce manufacturers to mar-
ket adequately safe products.
(6) Sellers almost invariably are in a better position than consumers to absorb or
spread the costs of product accidents.
(7) The costs of injuries flowing from typical risks inherent in products can fairly
be put upon the enterprises marketing the products as a cost of their doing busi-
ness, thus assuring that these enterprises will fully "pay their way" in the society
from which they derive their profits.
Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 681, 684-85
(1980) (relying on Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of
Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C.L. REv. 803, 809-10 (1976)).
60. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960);
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 97, at 650 (4th ed. 1971).
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provements to decrease the risk of injury to the ultimate user of its
product."1 Second, courts impose products liability based on the
belief that manufacturers can internalize the cost of insuring the
public's safety through production efficiency and higher prices."2 In
short, a manufacturer can treat the burdens of products liability
law as a cost of doing business.
The government contract defense is sensitive to the issues of
accountability and cost. It presupposes that tort liability should
not be imposed on an "otherwise innocent contractor whose only
role in causing [injury to a third party] . ..was the proper per-
formance of a plan supplied by the government."'63 Tort liability,
as the Agent Orange I court observed, is intended to deter contrac-
tors from engaging in practices that might invite injury to others."
But, if the contractor is not in a position to prevent the tortious
act or omission-and it is not if it must follow the contract's speci-
fications-then the imposition of products liability becomes pur-
poseless and unduly harsh.
The harshness of imposing products liability upon the contrac-
tor who follows the government's contract specifications is drama-
tized by an analysis of the relationship between liability and prod-
uct cost. Presumably, the potential risk to a government contractor
under products liability is great, owing to the scores of items pro-
duced and the large number of users. High risk usually invites high
insurance premiums, unless the impact of liability can be signifi-
cantly diluted by an industrywide pooling of the risk. A contractor
who makes no changes in either production or business costs, and
who wants to keep his profit margin intact, has little choice but to
raise his prices substantially.6 5 The government, in turn, would
have to pay significantly higher prices for the contractor's services.
Past experience indicates that the government will incur these
costs only if absolutely necessary.6
61. See Agent Orange I, 506 F. Supp. at 793 (citing W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 4, at
23 (4th ed. 1971)).
62. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962).
63. Agent Orange , 506 F. Supp. at 793.
64. Id.
65. G. SULLIVAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: WHO NEEDS IT? 18-19 (1979). See generally R.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 88-95 (1972); McKean, Products Liability: Implica-
tions of Some Changing Property Rights, in THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS 258-
72 (H. Manne ed. 1975).
66. The Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976 ("Swine Flu Act"), 42 U.S.C.
§ 247b(j)-(l) (1976), amended by Pub. L. No. 95-626, 92 Stat. 3551 (1978), is a case in point.
In March 1976, President Ford requested that Congress pass an appropriations bill to
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Contractors who manufacture weapons in wartime face further
difficulties in maintaining a reasonable price structure. The prob-
lem areas of unique concern to a military manufacturer include: 1)
preventing a qualitative reduction in the technical performance
and reliability of a manufactured weapon; 2) quickly producing a
satisfactory product on short notice; and 3) controlling the cost of
ordnance development.6 7 Characteristically, predictions of these
variables are more difficult during wartime.
The soldier, like a consumer, often is ignorant of defects in the
weapons he uses;" but unlike its nonmilitary counterpart, the de-
finance a massive immunization program intended to avert a swine flu epidemic forecast for
that fall. Hunt v. United States, 636 F.2d 580, 589 & n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Although Con-
gress acceded to the President's request, problems developed when the vaccine manufactur-
ers refused to participate because their insurers would not underwrite strict products liabil-
ity policies. Id. at 589-90 & n.26. After the insurance companies rejected proposals that
called for the government either to indemnify or reinsure the insurance companies, Congress
hastily passed, and the President quickly signed, the Swine Flu Act. Id. at 590-91. Under
the Swine Flu Act, "[a] claim that would otherwise have been available against a program
participant [defined under § 247b(k)(2)(B) of the Act to include the vaccine manufacturer
or distributor, the agency or organization that administered the vaccinations, and the medi-
cal personnel who assisted in providing the innoculations] instead would be brought against
the United States, under the procedures of the Tort Claims Act, with the United States
substituting for the program participant as the party defendant." Id. at 592. Congress
agreed to insure the program participants from products liability "on an emergency basis,"
id. at 592 n.33, to avoid "a serious potential public health threat." Id. at 589.
. But for extraordinary circumstances such as the feared swine flu epidemic, Congress
generally does not insure its operatives against products liability. This policy is consistent
with the intent of the Federal Tort Claims Act not to expose the government to limitless
liability. See, e.g., Clemente v. United States, 567 F.2d 1140, 1146 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978); Gelley v. Astra Pharmaceutical Prods., Inc., 446 F. Supp. 182,
186 (D. Minn.), aff'd, 610 F.2d 558 (8th Cir. 1979); In re Franklin Nat'l Bank Sec. Litig., 445
F. Supp. 723, 731 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Seas. 2 (1945); see
also Gellhorn & Schenck, Tort Actions Against the Federal Government, 47 COLUM. L. REv.
722, 722 (1947) (the doctrine of sovereign immunity survived in the United States after the
Revolutionary War because of concern about the financial instability of the early states).
Thus far, Congress has failed to adopt comprehensive legislation that would protect the
chemical companies in the Agent Orange controversy from products liability. If Congress is
reluctant to pass an insurance scheme as all-encompassing as the Swine Flu Act, then per-
haps a measure that imposes a ceiling on the contractor's liability would be more palatable.
See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 65 (1978) (discussing
Price-Anderson Act of 1957, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)) ("[N]uclear industry
was required to purchase the maximum available amount of privately underwritten public
liability insurance, and . . . if damages from a nuclear disaster exceeded . . . that private
insurance coverage, the Federal Government would indemnify the licensee . .. in an
amount not to exceed $500 million."); see also infra note 74.
67. See infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
68. A soldier's lack of familiarity with the weapon that caused his injuries is relevant in
a negligence case. See, e.g., Littlehale v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 268 F. Supp. 791
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), af'd, 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967) (explosives manufacturer had no duty to
issue detailed warning to unforeseeable user).
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fense contractor cannot always impose rigorous quality control
measures. Contractor compliance with military orders often re-
quires quick work, the use of untested materials, and innovative
laboratory techniques. These requirements increase uncertainty
and reduce the likelihood of effective quality control. 9 Therefore,
due to time constraints ultimately imposed by the war itself, gov-
ernment contractors often must sacrifice some measure of product
safety.70 Quality control becomes even more difficult when a manu-
facturer must make wholesale changes in its mode of operation and
sizeably increase its labor force to complete a contract.
71
This reduction in quality control, coupled with the widespread
use of weapons and other military products, makes it considerably
more difficult for a government contractor to warrant the safety of
its product at an affordable price.7 2 No problem would exist if the
government had carte blanche to spend money for weapons. But
the government does not have an unlimited defense budget, not
even in wartime; it still remains economically and politically ac-
countable for its defense expenditures. Consequently, without the
government contract defense, a contractor would be required to in-
ternalize the costs of insuring its weapons' ultimate users, a partic-
ularly heavy burden to bear.7 8 Not surprisingly, a contractor whose
defective product injures many soldiers, as in Agent Orange, faces
almost certain financial ruin.7' Because the market forces that reg-
69. See Moore, Efficiency and Public Policy in Defense Procurement, 29 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 3, 8-9 (1964).
70. See Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
In Montgomery a dirigible manufactured for the Navy crashed when its defectively made
seams split. In a suit by a passenger injured in the crash, the dirigible's manufacturer ar-
gued that the defects that caused the crash were in large measure due to its expedition of
the government's wartime order. The court acknowledged that wartime orders might require
the sacrifice of some element of safety, but still found the manufacturer liable for breach of
an implied warranty. Id. at 450.
71. For example, during World War II, Chrysler Corporation transformed itself from a
manufacturer of civilian automobiles into a producer of tanks, guns, and ammunition. The
company built new manufacturing plants and, by 1943, had increased its labor force twenty-
fold. W. STOUT, BULLETS BY THE BILLIONS 2 (1946).
72. See RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIvE ACTIvITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 16
(R. Nelson ed. 1963); Kerr, Techniques of Measuring Cost-Effectiveness of Weapons Sys-
tems, 75 AERONAUTICAL J. 665 (1971); see also Dix & Riddell, Projecting Cost-Performance
Trade-Offs for Military Vehicles, 14 ASTRONAUTICS & AERONAUTICS 40, 42, 48-49 (1976);
Hudock, Building an Affordable Weapon, 13 ASTRONAUTICS & AERONAUTICS 2, 3 (1975); cf.
L. MARTIN, ARMS AND STRATEGY 269 (1975) (governments now realize that they must plan in
their budgets for the "high and rapidly rising cost of modern military equipment ... and
operations").
73. See Orion Ins. Co. v. United Technologies, 502 F. Supp. 173, 178 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
74. In Agent Orange the plaintiffs' seek damages "in the range of $4 billion to $40
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ulate military procurement are operative even in war, the govern-
ment contractor who must pay excessive amounts to obtain prod-
ucts liability insurance will elect not to compete for government
contracts that exact so large a price for so small a gain. As the
court in Agent Orange I explained,
Where ... manufacturers claim to have been compelled by fed-
eral law to produce a weapon of war without [the] ability to ne-
gotiate specifications, contract price or terms, the potential for
unfairly imposing liability becomes great. Without the govern-
ment contract defense a manufacturer capable of producing mil-
itary goods for government use would face the untenable posi-
tion of choosing between severe penalties for failing to supply
products necessary to conduct a war, and producing what the
government requires but at a contract price that makes no pro-
vision for the need to insure against potential liability for design
flaws in the government's plans.
7 6
billion." Agent Orange III, 635 F.2d at 989 n.5. The plaintiffs concede that the defendants
are incapable of compensating the entire plaintiff class. Id. at 989 (citing Complaint 115).
The prospects are not much brighter for asbestos manufacturers involved in similar
lawsuits. Johns-Manville Corporation, the nation's largest asbestos manufacturer, filed for
reorganization under chapter 11 of the federal bankruptcy code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1146
(Supp. IV 1980), when it became apparent that defending the pending (16,500) and antici-
pated lawsuits (32,000) by workers stricken with asbestos-related diseases would cost the
company over two billion dollars. Miami Herald, Aug. 29, 1982, at P1, col. 1. But cf.
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 54 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("The size of the
catastrophe does not excuse liability but, on its face, eloquently pleads that it could not
have resulted from any prudently operated government project, and that injury so sudden
and sweeping should not lie where it has fallen.").
In the Agent Orange controversy, approximately 2.5 million people are "at risk" be-
cause of exposure to the herbicide. This does not include either teratogenic children or chil-
dren yet to be born whose fathers carry defective genes as a result of exposure. The size of
this potential plaintiff class probably will spell financial disaster for the defendant chemical
companies if they lose the present litigation.
Insurance law does not provide the chemical companies with much comfort. The com-
mon law permits insurance companies to limit their liability for injuries during wartime
because of the increased risk they otherwise would be required to bear. See generally Si-
mon, The Dilemma of War and Military Exclusion Clauses in Insurance Contracts, 19 Am.
Bus. L.J. 31 (1981); Note, War Exclusion Clauses and Undeclared Wars, 39 TENN. L. Rv.
328 (1972). At least one commentator has suggested the formation of a contractor trust
fund, administered by the insurance industry, to pay compensatory damages to soldiers in-
jured by Agent Orange. Meyers, supra note 3, at 192; supra note 66.
75. See, e.g., Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497 (1949). Wartime con-
ditions serve to reinforce the government policy "to refrain ... from doing its own manu-
facturing and to use, as much as possible (in the production of munitions), the experience in
mass production and the genius for organization that has made American industry out-
standing in the world." Id. at 506; Mansfield, Contribution of Research and Development to
Economic Growth of the United States, in RESEARCH AsN DEvL oruzz AND ECONOMIC
GaOWTf/PRoDucvrrnY 21 (1971).
76. Agent Orange 1, 506 F. Supp. at 794.
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Given the potential economic demise posed by the imposition
of products liability, it follows that a contractor who accepts a gov-
ernment contract will be wary of deviating from the commonly ac-
cepted methods of design or production at a time when innovation
may be required to satisfy the government's order." Advanced
weapons systems, by definition, necessitate new ideas and methods
of solving problems. Often during war, little testing time is availa-
ble before deployment of a weapon 8 The engineering and scien-
tific communities will be less responsive to wartime needs if they
are faced with products liability for a defective innovation.
The government contract defense has-not yet received wide-
spread support from the courts79 or legal scholars.80 The disagree-
ment starts with the defense's underlying premise that the govern-
ment, as the architect of its contract specifications, is responsible
for the consequences of the nonnegligent application of the plans
by the contractor. Critics of the defense argue that it is nothing
more than an unjustified dilution of the products liability doc-
trine.81 Products liability, they suggest, is indifferent to the influ-
ence of the warranty or sovereign immunity doctrines; all that is
necessary to establish contractor liability is proof that a defective
or unreasonably dangerous product manufactured by the contrac-
tor injured the user. Accordingly, if a manufactured product is de-
fective, the contractor should be liable ipso facto under products
liability law.
The criticism leveled at the government contract defense is
based on traditional notions of products liability, and completely
ignores the unique "considerations of fairness and public policy"8 2
77. See, e.g., Orion Ins. Co. v. United Technologies, 502 F. Supp. 173, 178 (E.D. Pa.
1980); cf. Comment, Products Liability: The Impact on California Manufacturers, 19 Am.
Bus. L.J. 343, 357-58 (1981) (over 20% of the manufacturers responding reported that they
dropped product lines due to products liability law).
78. See Butz, Unexpected Rocket Problems Boost Test Facility Needs, AVIATION WK.,
Jan. 4, 1960, at 52.
79. See, e.g., Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 388 (1938)
(government-financed and managed corporation may be sued if Congress has expressly con-
ferred the authority to sue and be sued; generally, "government does not become the con-
duit of its immunity in suits against its agents or instrumentalities merely because they do
the work"); Challoner v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 512 F.2d 77 (5th Cir.), vacated on other
grounds, 423 U.S. 3 (1975); Whittaker v. Harvell-Kilgore Corp., 418 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir.
1969).
80. See Davis, supra note 8; Commentary, supra note 3, at 176-77; Comment, The Gov-
ernment Contract Defense in Strict Liability Suits for Defective Design, 48 U. CHI. L. REv.
1016 (1981).
81. See Davis, supra note 8, at 50.
82. Agent Orange 1, 506 F. Supp. at 793.
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that serve as the foundation of the defense."3 The government con-
tract defense recognizes the special role played by the government
in the procurement process." The thrust of the defense is that the
government's decision to contract is a discretionary function that
must remain unencumbered, notwithstanding an otherwise valid
concern for user safety. The flexibility to make discretionary deci-
sions is assured as long as there remain manufacturers willing to
contract and the government can afford to pay for the manufactur-
ers' services or materials. Products liability threatens this flex-
ibility by either requiring the government to pay substantially
higher prices for the products it procures8" or by limiting the num-
ber of contractors willing to undertake a government order."
Simply because the need to protect the government's discre-
tionary authority over military procurement supersedes the impo-
sition of products liability does not mean that user safety is ig-
nored under the government contract defense. Presumably, the
government acts in the best interests of the citizenry, 7 and it will
83. Not surprisingly, critics of the government contract defense urge the imposition of
traditional products liability law. A complaint based on negligence or breach of warranty is
not likely to succeed if either the contract specifications were not patently defective or the
contractor made no representations that potential users might rely upon in purchasing the
product. Thus, strict products liability may be the only legal avenue still available to an
injured party. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
84. The presence of the government in the contracting process requires the courts to
apply a different judicial standard. See Agent Orange 1, 534 F. Supp. at 1054 n.1. As one
court observed:
[W]here a party contracts with the Government and the Government specifies
the means by which the product is to be manufactured and other details inci-
dent to the production, the manufacturer's acts in accordance with the plans are
at the very least not measurable by the same tests applicable to a manufacturer
having sole discretion over the method of manufacture, and at the most are insu-
lated from any liability.
Littlehale v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 268 F. Supp. 791, 804 n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
aff'd, 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967); see R.M. Hollingshead Corp. v. United States, 111 F.
Supp. 285, 286 (Ct. Cl. 1953).
85. See supra notes 65-76 and accompanying text.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.
87. Our Founding Fathers envisioned a government that would act in the national in-
terest. James Madison, writing in the tenth Federalist, observed:
The effect of [citizens delegating power to a few representatives] ... is...
to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a
chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their
country, and whose patriotism and love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice
it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well
happen, that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people,
will be more consonant to the public good, than if pronounced by the people
themselves, convened for that purpose.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 109-10 (J. Madison) (J. Hamilton ed. 1873).
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not order the manufacture of a hazardous product unless neces-
sary. Further, it is questionable whether product safety would im-
prove if products liability were imposed on government contrac-
tors, because no pressure is placed on the government to provide
specifications that will result in the manufacture of safer prod-
ucts.88 Scrutinizing the actions of the government contractor will
not necessarily cause it to furnish a safer product, because it still is
required to follow the contract's specifications. Admittedly, the
contractor should and, in fact, is legally required to notify the gov-
ernment of defects in the specifications.89 But the reality of the
situation is that if the government does not agree to changes in the
specifications, then the contractor must either forfeit the job or
make the changes and assume responsibility for the consequences
of its actions.'0
Those who criticize the use of the government contract de-
fense to relieve a manufacturer of products liability also argue that
commercial and military contractors face similar problems, and
therefore both should be held accountable under tort law. This
comparison fails to recognize, however, that weapons development
The United States Constitution is replete with examples of our Founding Fathers' be-
lief that the government should act in the best interests of the citizenry. See, for example,
the preamble to the United States Constitution, along with article I, section 8, and the Bill
of Rights. Historians have documented this conceptualization of the Constitution as being
not only desirable, but also necessary to ensure that private concerns did not motivate gov-
ernment decisions. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND
WECHSLER'S FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1-3 (2d ed. 1973).
The fact that a state officer can be subjected to a federal injunction when he exceeds
the scope of his powers also supports the proposition that the government and its officials
are expected to act in the best interests of the citizenry. This analysis, first explained in Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159 (1908), suggests that a state officer or agent who acts uncon-
stitutionally is susceptible to a federal injunctive order because he is not acting on behalf of
the state. The conclusion assumes that the constitutional actions of a state official are not
personally motivated; rather, they are based on the official's view of the needs of the state's
citizenry. Id. at 160; see also Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689-90
(1948) (private corporations sought to enjoin the War Assets Administration from selling or
delivering coal to any customer other than itself); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1
(1849) (President acted properly in calling out militia to quell an uprising among Rhode
Island citizens who were attempting to replace their colonial charter with a new
constitution).
The author wishes to thank Professor Patrick Gudridge of the University of Miami
School of Law for his helpful advice on this point.
88. The doctrine of sovereign immunity protects the government from tort liability; the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2404, 2411-2412,
2671-2680 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), delineates the circumstances in which the government
has waived this immunity. See infra notes 112-21 and accompanying text.
89. See supra note 34.
90. See supra notes 21, 30 & 31.
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is like few other activities in the American economy."1 In their
book, The Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis,"2
authors Peck and Scherer explain the differences:
[Military manufacturing] is characterized by unique elements of
uncertainty resulting from the combination of, first, the extent
to which weapons press the limits of existing engineering art and
scientific knowledge["] and, second, the character of the de-
mand for weapons in a cold war environment.[9"] The better
performance of commercial develol~ments in staying within
budgets, meeting schedules, and achieving performance objec-
tives is eplained largely by the fact that most commercial prod-
uct developments are not initiated until major state of the art
and marketing uncertainties have been resolved.[95] Under ex-
traordinary competitive pressures, a commercial development
occasionally does push the state of the art in a weapons-like
way. On such occasions, weapons-like problems tend to occur;
cost targets are exceeded, schedules are slipped, and the product
fails to meet its performance promises. This would suggest that
comparison of weapons and typical commercial developments is
91. Government contractors unsuccessfully raised this defense in Montgomery v. Good-
year Tire & Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). In Montgomery the contractors
had argued that the government's specifications limited their control over the manufactur-
ing process. Such restrictions typically distinguish weapons 'development from the normal
commercial production of goods. For a discussion of this case, see supra note 18.
92. M. PECK & F. ScHERER, THE WEAPONS AcQuIsITIoN PROCESS: AN ECONOMIC ANALY-
sis (1960).
93. See Dix & Riddell, supra note 72; Hudock, supra note 72, at 2, 4; Mansfield, supra
note 75, at 24; Woolett, Physics and Modern Warfare: The Awkward Science, 48 Am. J.
PHYS. 104 (1980).
94. See Smith, Understanding Weapons Development, 10 ASTRONAUTICS & AERONAU-
TIcs 16 (1972).
95. Novick, What Do We Mean by Research and Development?, CAL. MGMT. RaV.,
Spring 1960, at 9, 9-14. The bulk of commercial research and development activity involves
relatively minor improvements or modifications to existing products or processes. Id.
Peck and Scherer studied the contrast between military and commercial manufacturing
in the late 1950's and early 1960's. They found that the manufacture of military hardware
was substantially more dependent upon research and development expenditures than the
fabrication of commercial products. M. PECK & F. SCHERER, supra note 92, at 25 & n.10.
This trend prevails today. The government financed 79% of the aircraft and missile indus-
try in 1975. In contrast, the next highest proportion of government financing was in electri-
cal equipment (45%), followed by the machinery (14%), motor vehicle (14%), and chemical
(9%) industries. NAT'L SCIENCE FOUND., RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN INDUSTRY 1975, at 2
(1977).
Research and development expenditures constituted 13% of military aircraft and mis-
sile industry sales during 1977. In contrast, these expenditures averaged only 3.1% for all
American industries. Even in research-oriented private industries, such as scientific instru-
ments and chemicals, research and development expenditures amounted to only 5.6% and
3.6% of 1977 sales, respectively. NAT'L SCIENCE FOUND., RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN IN-
DUSTRY 1977, at 27 (1979).
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hardly a fair index of relative efficiency, and that the direct
transfer of business practice to weapons efforts is not, in and of
itself, a meaningful solution for improving the acquisition of
technically advanced weapons."
Military manufacturing also differs from commercial con-
tracting in that it is not subject to the typical pressures of supply
and demand. Technological improvements or military necessity
can render a weapons system obsolete; demand can drop precip-
itously to zero. Unless the product has some commercial utility,
the contractor has little choice but to halt production. Commercial
contractors generally are not held hostage by a rapidly changing
demand for their product. Unlike military manufacturers, they can
adjust production and design to reflect changes in marketplace
demand.9
The presence of the government in the procurement process
also distinguishes military and commercial contractors. Commonly,
the government plays an integral role in weapons production, ei-
ther purchasing and supplying raw materials or monitoring the
production process.98 In many respects, the government, by exer-
cising considerable influence in the procurement process, assumes
responsibility for the risks of production. 9 The government's pres-
ence, coupled with the aforementioned factors, serves to blur the
allocation of risk among the participants; "it certainly does not re-
semble the allocation of risk in a normal commercial market and
since it does not, the typical incentive and profit arrangements of a
commercial market cannot or should not be applied in the same
way to defense procurement."100
By warranting nonnegligently manufactured weapons pro-
duced pursuant to its specifications, the government recognizes the
unworkability of subjecting a contractor to products liability. 10'
The contractor is not held accountable for injuries caused by a de-
96. M. PECK & F. SCHERER, supra note 92, at 8-9.
97. Moore, supra note 69, at 6-7.
98. Id. at 6-8; see, e.g., Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 18 (1952) (government
supervised direction and control of project; Army personnel were responsible for application
of plans and overseeing production schedules); Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339
U.S. 497, 500 & n.4, 507-08 & n.8 (1949) (government owned plant, equipment, and raw
materials; contractor managed activity of personnel); Whitaker v. Harvell-Kilgore Corp., 418
F.2d 1010, 1012-13 (5th Cir. 1969) (government owned plant facility and component parts,
and monitored assembly of grenades); Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310, 316-17
(9th Cir. 1961) (Air Force supervised manufacture and testing of B-52 bomber aircraft).
99. See supra notes 24-34 and accompanying text.
100. Moore, supra note 69, at 9.
101. See supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text.
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fective government specification; the government provides the
plans and ordinarily takes responsibility for their suitability and
safety. 102 In the event a defective weapon injures a soldier, he may
seek relief through numerous government military benefit pro-
grams.10 3 Because the soldier does not rely on the government con-
tractor to compensate him for wartime injuries, there is no justifi-
cation for imposing products liability on the contractor; the
government, not the contractor, is responsible for both warranting
the product and compensating the injured. As a matter of policy,
then, the government contractor's duty to produce an item-with
the attendant constraints of cost, time, or untested materi-
als-supersedes a third party's right to rely on the contractor to
warrant the safety of the weapon. 104
B. The Necessity for Government Discretionary Authority
The Agent Orange II court concluded that the doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity is the underlying rationale for the government
contract defense. 1 5 The threshold inquiry under this doctrine is
whether the government's procurement decision is a discretionary
function that is immune from products liability under the Federal
Tort Claims Act. Under the government contract defense, the gov-
ernment "extends" its immunity to contractors who have per-
formed their contract obligations nonnegligently. 10 6
102. See cases cited supra note 26.
103. GI benefit programs are authorized by such statutes as 10 U.S.C. §§ 1071-1087
(1976) (medical care for members of uniformed services and their dependents); 38 U.S.C.
§§ 310-315 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (wartime disability compensation); id. §§ 321-322 (war-
time death compensation); id. §§ 331-335 (peacetime disability compensation); id. §§ 341-
342 (peacetime death compensation).
These benefit programs are usually a soldier's only source of relief because the Feres
doctrine prevents a soldier from suing the government for injuries sustained "incident to
service." Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); see supra note 17.
104. See infra notes 176-82 and accompanying text.
105. See Agent Orange II, 534 F. Supp. at 1055 & n.2. Curiously, the court did not
address the interplay between warranty law and the government contract defense, even
though the elements of the defense are based on fundamental principles of contract law.
106. Id. at 794. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held
that "when the government undertakes to perform services, which in the absence of specific
legislation would not be required, it will, nevertheless, be liable if these activities are per-
formed negligently." Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, 373 F.2d 227, 236 (2d Cir. 1967) (citing
United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112-13 (1954)); see Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co.,
309 U.S. 18 (1940); Myers v. United States, 323 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1963); Harris v. United
States, 205 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1953); Green v. ICI Am., Inc., 362 F. Supp. 1263 (E.D. Tenn.
1973); Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 824 (D. Conn. 1965).
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1. ORIGIN OF, AND LIMITATIONS ON, THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY
The government's immunity from tort liability originated with
the belief that "the king can do no wrong. ' 107 With the democrati-
zation of politics, sovereign immunity assured that statesmen could
govern without constant harrassment from disapproving members
of the public. As explained by one court:
If [a public official] is to do the job of governing well, then there
is something to be said for withholding the threat of answer-
ability in damages for at least some of the actions and decisions
which governing necessarily entails. He who rules must make
choices among competing courses of action and in the face of
conflicting considerations of policy. The capacity and the incen-
tive to govern effectively are arguably not enhanced by the pros-
pect of being sued by those citizens who may be adversely af-
fected by the choice eventually made. Thus it has been thought
wise to sweep this restrictive cloud from the horizon and to let
those responsible for the conduct of public affairs calculate their
courses of action free of this intimidating influence.108
The Supreme Court of the United States traditionally was re-
luctant to subject the federal government to suits by disgruntled
citizens. 09 The Court begrudgingly conceded in 1824, however,
that the government could be sued with its consent."0 What the
Justices would not permit,"' the Congress sanctioned in, 1946 by
passing the Federal Tort Claims Act (the "Act")." 2 The Act
waived the United States government's sovereign immunity for the
torts of its employees by granting the federal district courts juris-
107. Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 824, 825 (D. Conn. 1965)
(quoting Elgin v. District of Columbia, 337 F.2d 152, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1964)). A corollary prin-
ciple is that government susceptibility to tort liability is incongruous with principles of sov-
ereignty. See Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1963).
108. Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 824, 825-26 (D. Conn. 1965)
(quoting Elgin v. District of Columbia, 337 F.2d 152, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1964)).
109. See, e.g., Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907); United States v.
Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 207 (1882); Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 386, 389 (1850); Co-
hens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821).
110. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
111. See generally 30 GEO. L.J. 462 (1942) (examination of lawsuits against the govern-
ment before the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act).
112. Pub. L. No. 601, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291,
1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2404, 2411-2412, 2671-2680 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)). Congress
passed the Act to relieve itself of the burdensome necessity of passing thousands of private
bills to satisfy claims, and to eliminate the unfairness of denying injured private citizens
recovery against the government. H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945).
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diction over suits for damages "caused by the negligent or wrongful
act or omission of any employee of the Government." ' 3 The Act
also contains certain limits on the United States' tort liability,
three of which are relevant to this Comment.
First, section 2671 of the Act provides that the term "Federal
agency" as used in the Act's jurisdiction-granting provision "does
not include any contractor with the United States."1"" Because the
employees for whose acts the government accepts liability under
the doctrine of respondeat superior must be employees of a "fed-
eral agency," this definition precludes the government's liability
for the torts of an independent government contractor. Second,
section 1346(b) of the Act limits the liability of the United States
to the "negligent or wrongful" acts of its employees."' Courts have
interpreted this language to preclude government liability based on
strict liability in tort."' Finally, section 2680(a) of the Act provides
that the United States' waiver of sovereign immunity does not ex-
tend to claims arising from a government employee's performance
of a "discretionary function or duty."'
17
As these limitations on the scope of the Act illustrate, the gov-
ernment does not protect the contractor who negligently performs
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
114. Id. § 2671. Section 2671 provides:
As used in this chapter and sections 1346(b) and 2401(b) of this title, the
term "Federal agency" includes the executive departments, the military depart-
ments, independent establishments of the United States, and corporations pri-
marily acting as instrumentalities or agencies of the United States, but does not
include any contractor with the United States.
"Employee of the government" includes officers or employees of any federal
agency, members of the military or naval forces of the United States, and per-
sons acting on behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity, temporarily or
permanently in the service of the United States, whether with or without
compensation.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 526-27 (1973).
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
116. See, e.g., Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972); see also Dalehite v. United States,
346 U.S. 15, 45 (1953) (United States assumes no liability from its "ownership of an 'inher-
ently dangerous commodity' or property, or [from] engaging in an 'extrahazardous' activ-
ity"); infra note 130 and accompanying text. Contra Peck, Absolute Liability and the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act, 9 STAN. L. REv. 433 (1957). The United States still may be liable for
its own employees' independent acts of negligence that occur in connection with a govern-
ment contractor's work. Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 530-32.(1973).
117. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976) provides that the government's assumption of liability
under the Act does not apply to "[a]ny claim. . . based upon the exercise or performance or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be
abused." For a discussion of section 2680(a), see Harris & Schnepper, Federal Tort Claims
Act: Discretionary Function Exception Revisited, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 161 (1976).
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the government's orders."1 Nor does the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity protect a contractor from liability for actions that are not
authorized by,"1 9 or necessary to,1 20 the fulfillment of the contract.
In a typical government contract scenario, the United States re-
quests that the contractor build a weapon or product with certain
capabilities. If the contract grants the government contractor the
discretionary authority to devise a design or manufacturing scheme
to produce the weapon or product, then the contractor must exer-
cise that discretion nonnegligently. In this situation,
[w]here the act or failure to act, which causes an injury [to a
third person] is one which the [government] contractor was em-
ployed to do and the injury results not from the negligent man-
ner of doing the work, but from the performance thereof... ,
the contractor is entitled to share the immunity from liability
which the public enjoys .... 121
2. DEFINITION OF A DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION OR DUTY
Assuming that the manufacturer has performed nonneg-
ligently, the inquiry then shifts to the nature of the government's
decision to order the procurement of the product. In this context,
the fundamental question in determining whether the govern-
ment's immunity is extended to a contractor is whether the con-
tractor's activities are pursuant to a government discretionary de-
cision. The Supreme Court of the United States defined
government discretionary functions or duties in Dalehite v. United
States.
1 22
After the Second World War, Germany, Japan, and Korea
lacked the capacity to feed their people; hunger threatened to pro-
duce internal unrest. To quell potential Korean protests and sus-
tain its armed forces, the United States War Department con-
118. See, e.g., Ross v. United States, 640 F.2d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 1981); In re Franklin
Nat'l Bank Sec. Litig., 445 F. Supp. 723, 735 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); see also Merritt, Chapman &
Scott Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 295 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1961); York Cove Corp. v. United
States, 317 F. Supp. 799, 809 (E.D. Va. 1970); supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text; cf.
H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 5 (1945) (Tort Claims Act does not seek to
impose liability on the government "where no negligence on the part of any Government
agent is shown.").
119. Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 20-21 (1940).
120. Converse v. Portsmouth Cotton Oil Ref. Corp., 281 F. 981, 984 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 260 U.S. 724 (1922); Schrader v. Hercules, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 159 (W.D. Va. 1980).
121. Green v. ICI Am., Inc., 362 F. Supp. 1263, 1265 (E.D. Tenn. 1973) (emphasis
added), quoted in Agent Orange I, 506 F. Supp. at 793; see Converse v. Portsmouth Cotton
Oil Ref. Corp., 281 F. 981, 984 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 260 U.S. 724 (1922).
122. 346 U.S. 15, 34-36 (1953).
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tracted for the manufacture of fertilizer from surplus explosive
compounds, 23 detailing the specifications for production, packag-
ing, labeling, and shipping."2 4 A cargo ship holding the finished fer-
tilizer and other explosives exploded while in port, killing many
people and razing much of the port city. The subsequent actions
for damages, brought by persons injured in the explosion, tested
the feasibility of suing the United States for personal and property
injuries sustained as a result of a government wartime program.
Although the district court awarded damages to the plaintiffs, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed,
holding that the United States could not be sued for injuries indi-
rectly caused by a discretionary act of the War Department. 25
The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the Fifth
Circuit's decision, holding that section 2680(a) of the Federal Tort
Claims Act barred claims arising from the explosion because the
decision to manufacture the fertilizer and the specifications for its
production and handling "were all responsibly made at a planning
rather than operational level and involved considerations . . . im-
portant to the practicability of the Government's fertilizer pro-
gram."' The Court broadly defined a discretionary function as an
action requiring a "policy judgment and decision."' 27 Thus,
Dalehite established a distinction between those acts of the gov-
ernment that are "discretionary" and those that are "operational"
and therefore actionable under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 28
The import of Dalehite, and its relevance to the extended im-
munity doctrine, was addressed in Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v.
United States."' In Dolphin Gardens the government employed a
contractor to dredge a river channel. The government ordered the
123. Id. at 18-21.
124. Id. at 20, 39-40.
125. In re Texas City Disaster Litig., 197 F.2d 771, 778-81 (5th Cir. 1952), af'd sub
noma. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
126. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 42 (emphasis added). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Jack-
son reached a different conclusion:
The Government's negligence here was not in policy decisions of a regula-
tory or governmental nature, but involved actions akin to those of a private
manufacturer, contractor, or shipper. Reading the discretionary exception as we
do, in a way both workable and faithful to legislative intent, we would hold that
the Government was liable under these circumstances.
Id. at 60 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
127. 346 U.S. at 36.
128. The Court further explained that under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the United
States could not be held strictly liable. Rather, the Act only applied to a "'negligent or
wrongful act or omission' of [a government] employee." Id. at 44-45.
129. 243 F. Supp. 824 (D. Conn. 1965).
19821
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
contractor to deposit the dredged material onto a shoreside vacant
lot near the plaintiff's land. Ultimately, fumes emanating from this
depository reacted with the exterior surface of the plaintiff's build-
ings and caused severe damage. The plaintiff's lessee sued both the
government and the contractor for damages. The court granted the
government's motion for summary judgment because "[tihe selec-
tion and approval of the [deposit] site. . . and the decision not to
take any precautions concerning the possible escape of fumes are
. . . within the scope of 'discretionary functions' . . . . 0 The
contractor also successfully moved to dismiss. The court reasoned
that in failing to provide warnings about the subsequent escape of
fumes, the contractor was carrying out "a decision which rested
with the Government.''1
In the aftermath of Dalehite and Dolphin Gardens, courts
have construed more narrowly the definition of a "discretionary
function or duty." For example, although the Coast Guard's deci-
sion to emplace a lighthouse is discretionary, its maintenance once
the device is in place is operational;" 2 the Air Force's decision to
commission the construction of airplanes is discretionary, but not
the acceptance of the aircraft with a negligently designed pilot's
ejection seat. 88 Although the decision to order nuclear testing, 4
to sell asbestos in unmarked crates to knowledgeable buyers,33 to
approve a drug as safe for use,"" to contract out the conduct of
nuclear research projects, 3 7 or to spray herbicide on government
land'3 8 is discretionary, it is conceivable that an order not to issue
130. Id. at 826 (relying on Dalehite, 346 U.S. 15 (1953)). An affidavit filed by the naval
officer in charge of the dredging project revealed that (1) the government had conducted an
exhaustive search for feasible sites and had concluded that the selected site was the only
one of acceptable size available, and (2) the Navy had planned to use the river shortly there-
after for its nuclear submarines and therefore, placed the dredging project on a "high prior-
ity." Id.
131. Id. at 827.
132. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69 (1955); cf. Miller v.
United States, 480 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (government liable for negligent manner
in which its agents operated flood gates).
133. See Moyer v. Martin Marietta Corp., 481 F.2d 585, 598 (5th Cir. 1973).
134. See Bartholomae Corp. v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 651 (S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd,
.253 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1957); see also Jaffe v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981)
(former serviceman who claimed that government intentionally exposed him to nuclear test
radiation did not state actionable claim against government).
135. See Stewart v. United States, 486 F. Supp. 178, 184-85 (C.D. Ill. 1980).
136. See Gelley v. Astra Pharmaceutical Prods., Inc., 466 F. Supp. 182, 184-86 (D.
Minn.), aff'd, 610 F.2d 558, 563 (8th Cir. 1979).
137. See Bramer v. United States, 595 F.2d 1141, 1143-44 (9th Cir. 1979).
138. See Green v. United States, 629 F.2d 581, 585-86 (9th Cir. 1980); Harris v. United
States, 205 F.2d 765, 766-67 (10th Cir. 1953).
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warnings about the hazards of exposure from these activities is
operational.
139
The numerous interpretations'" of the Dalehite discretionary
doctrine indicate that the distinction between a "discretionary" or
an "operational" decision is difficult to ascertain precisely and ap-
ply consistently under the extended immunity theory."' Dolphin
Gardens offers one methodology for determining whether the gov-
ernment extends its immunity to a contractor; specifically, if the
third party's injury is "the result of an affirmative decision by the
government to act or not to act," then a contractor is immune from
liability because it is acting pursuant to the government's discre-
tionary authority." 2
But the application of the "policy" standard in Dolphin Gar-
dens, or the planning-operational dichotomy in Dalehite, lacks
meaning without reference to section 2680(a) of the Federal Tort
139. See, e.g., Broudy v. United States, 661 F.2d 125, 128-29 (9th Cir. 1981) (former
serviceman stated claim that government failed to warn about or monitor possible post-
discharge injuries arising from in-service exposure to nuclear test radiation); Barron v.
United States, 473 F. Supp. 1077, 1084 (D. Hawaii 1979) (Navy failed to take steps beyond
issuing warnings to enforce compliance with contractual safety requirements); cf. Thornwell
v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344, 347-53 (D.D.C. 1979) (Feres doctrine bars suit by vet-
eran who had been surreptitiously drugged with LSD and interrogated as part of Army
investigation into theft of classified documents; veteran could recover for Army's post-dis-
charge negligence in failing to provide proper follow-up care).
140. Other courts have attempted to define a "discretionary function" by establishing a
dichotomy between rule application and rulemaking, see, e.g., Hendry v. United States, 418
F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1969), or governmental activity and nongovernmental activity. But see
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
141. Some courts have attempted to lend some degree of predictability to the determi-
nation of what is or is not a "discretionary function." For example, the Washington Su-
preme Court formulated a four-pronged test to identify discretionary functions in Evangeli-
cal United Brethren Church v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 251, 407 P.2d 440, 445 (1965):
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or decision necessarily involve a basic gov-
ernmental policy, program, or objective? (2) Is the questioned act, omission, or
decision essential to the realization or accomplishment of that policy, program,
or objective as opposed to one which would not change the course or direction of
the policy, program, or objective? (3) Does the act, omission, or decision require
the exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the part of
the governmental agency involved? (4) Does the governmental agency involved
possess the requisite constitutional, statutory, or lawful authority and duty to do
or make the challenged act, omission, or decision? If these preliminary questions
can be clearly and unequivocally answered in the affirmative, then the chal-
lenged act, omission, or decision can, with a reasonable degree of assurance, be
classified as a discretionary governmental process and nontortious, regardless of
its unwisdom. If, however, one or more of the questions call for or suggest a
negative answer, then further inquiry may well become necessary, depending
upon the facts and circumstances involved.
142. Dolphin Gardens, 243 F. Supp. at 827. Nonetheless, the contractor will be liable if
he performs his duties negligently. Id.
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Claims Act and its underlying rationale. The exception carved out
by section 2680(a) safeguards the separation of powers by limiting
judicial interference with decisionmaking properly exercised by
other branches of the government.14 3 Congress included this provi-
sion in the Act because it did not want to allow the courts to sub-
stitute their judgment for that of a government official in deter-
mining the "propriety" of a discretionary act. 4 4 It feared that
judicial second-guessing of government policy decisions would in-
timidate officials and ultimately affect their judgment, particularly
if, as a result of the decision, the government was potentially liable
to an unknown number of people. 4 5 Congress viewed legal inter-
vention of this sort as tantamount to judicial control over adminis-
trative action and a serious handicap to efficient government
operation."
6
The Supreme Court in Dalehite accepted this rationale; it
contrasted the executive's discretion to act according to its best
judgment on matters of policy with judgments made "within the
limits of positive rules of law subject to judicial review. ' " 7 These
rules are absent "when the question is not negligence but social
wisdom, not due care but political practicability, not reasonable-
ness but economic expediency. Tort law simply furnishes an inade-
quate crucible for testing the merits of social, political, or economic
decisions.'
' 4 8
Some areas of government activity, by their nature, require
courts to weigh social, political, and economic factors. For example,
courts routinely find that discretion is involved in the promulga-
tion" 9 or enforcement' 5 0 of regulations, the award of government
143. Payton v. United States, 636 F.2d 132, 143 & n.25 (5th Cir. 1981) ("The crux of
the concept embodied in the discretionary function exemption is that of the separation of
powers.") (relying on legislative history of Federal Tort Claims Act); Medley v. United
States, 480 F. Supp. 1005, 1008 (M.D. Ala. 1979).
144. Tort Claims, Hearings Before Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R. 5373 and H.R.
6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1942) (discussions foreshadowing enactment of Federal Tort
Claims Act).
145. See supra text accompanying note 108.
146. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 163 (1963); see supra note 108.
147. Dalehite, 346 U.S. 15, 34 (1953).
148. Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160, 1170 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
149. E.g., Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 27; First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 552 F.2d 370
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 835 (1977); Miller v. United States, 522 F.2d 386 (6th Cir.
1975); Loge v. United States, 494 F. Supp. 883, 887-88 (W.D. Ark. 1980).
150. E.g., Emch v. United States, 630 F.2d 523, 527 n.24, 528 (7th Cir. 1980) (regulatory
and statutory supervision or monitoring of bank entities); Barton v. United States, 609 F.2d
977, 980 (10th Cir. 1979) (Bureau of Land Management order to discontinue grazing on
public lands); Bernitsky v. United States, 463 F. Supp. 1121 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (federal mine
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contracts," the direction of foreign affairs, ' and the determina-
tion of military tactics. 153 Courts do not presuppose, however, that
in making decisions in these areas, the government is guided by a
fixed set of rules delineating right from wrong. The reason for the
courts' reluctance to second-guess the government's choice in dis-
cretionary matters, simply stated, is that for a decision to be truly
"discretionary," the government must have the freedom to judge
or choose from a variety of options. The ultimate decision will af-
fect groups within the population differently; some will view the
decision as improper while others will applaud the choice. 154 Be-
cause reasonable minds can differ as to the correctness of the deci-
sion, tort law elects not to evaluate the decision, but rather to ex-
amine its execution, so that judicial redress does not jeopardize
"the quality and efficiency of government itself."' 5 5 Measuring a
discretionary decision by a judicial standard of conduct limits the
government's freedom to make decisions. Take away this flex-
ibility, and the job of decisionmaking tacitly becomes the responsi-
bility of the courts and not the people's elected representatives.
This, of course, violates the very principles upon which this coun-
try was founded.'
5
Translated into practical terms, the distinction between dis-
cretionary and operational decisions means that the decision not to
order a mechanical locking device on a dump truck,'57 or a canopy
on a bulldozer, 5 8 is reviewable because there exists a fixed stan-
dard for measuring the merits of these decisions, and judicial re-
view would not usurp the government's discretion in these areas.
Alternatively, the Army's decision to order jeeps without seatbelts
is not subject to judicial scrutiny because the courts lack the requi-
safety inspector's decision barring access to coal mine), afl'd, 620 F.2d 948 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 870 (1980).
151. E.g., Myers & Myers, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 527 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir.
1975).
152. E.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
153. E.g., Huslander v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 1004 (W.D.N.Y. 1964) (sonic boom
from supersonic flight); Barroll v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 441 (D. Md. 1956) (choice of
where to test cannons); Bartholomae Corp. v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 651 (S.D. Cal.
1955) (nuclear testing), afl'd, 253 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1957).
154. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 87, at 106-08; Gellhorn & Schenck, supra
note 66, at 739.
155. Payton v. United States, 636 F.2d 132, 143 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting Elgin v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 337 F.2d 152, 154-55 (D.C. Cir. 1964)).
156. See supra note 87.
157. See Medley v. United States, 480 F. Supp. 1005, 1009 (M.D. Ala. 1979).
158. See United States v. DeCamp, 478 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1973).
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site expertise and legal standards to judge the correctness of the
action.159 The district court in Agent Orange H concurred:
Courts should not require suppliers of ordnance to question
the military's needs or specifications for weapons during war-
time. Whether to use a particular weapon that creates a risk to
third parties, whether the risk could be avoided at additional
cost, whether the weapon could be made safer if a longer manu-
facturing time were allowed, indeed, whether the weapon in-
volves any risk at all, are all proper concerns of the military
which selects, buys and uses the weapon. But they are not
sources of liability which should be thrust upon a supplier, nor
are they decisions that are properly made by a court.00
If courts refuse to respect government immunization of con-
tractors, then the government is forced to insure the contractor,
order a battery of tests to determine whether the product is safe
(perhaps at a time when speed is critical), or cancel the project.
The first option would provide relief to third parties injured by a
defectively manufactured product, but only at great expense to the
government. If one assumes that the government seeks to manage
its operations-including a military effort-in the best interests of
the country, then the second and third options are inadvisable be-
cause they require the country's interest to be placed second to
individual protection (perhaps at a time of national need). Re-
strained by the costs, time, or military needs of war, the govern-
ment must use items that are known to be safe, but which may not
be as suitable or efficacious as another product. In this sense, the
imposition of products liability impairs the government's discre-
tionary authority to manage the affairs of the nation in peacetime
159. Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J. Super. 1, 364 A.2d 43 (Law Div. 1976), aft'd,
154 N.J. Super. 407, 381 A.2d 805 (App. Div. 1977), certification denied, 75 N.J. 616, 394
A.2d 846 (1978).
Compare the government's decision not to order a locking device on a dump truck,
Medley v. United States, 480 F. Supp. 1005 (M.D. Ala. 1979), with the government's deci-
sion in Sanner to order jeeps without seatbelts. In the former case, the government offered
no evidence that it omitted to include a safety device in its design of the dump truck as a
result of a conscious policy decision. In the latter, the Army's decision took into account the
ability of the soldiers either to escape quickly from the jeep in the event of enemy attack or
to respond quickly in kind with their own weapons. See supra note 52. The decision not to
order brakes for a truck did not involve considerations of practicability or social policy; the
decision is easily evaluated by conventional notions of reasonableness. The Army's decision
not to order seatbelts for its jeeps involved considerations of feasibility and strategy, both
inextricably linked with military policy, and neither measurable by the rules of law. All of
this assumes that there are some government decisions that are really guided by judicial
standards of right and wrong, even though they may tangentially take into account policy.
160. Agent Orange H, 534 F. Supp. at 1054.
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or wartime-products liability limits government options. This is
particularly true in times of war, as explained in Sanner v. Ford
Motor Co.:
To impose liability on a governmental- contractor who
strictly complies with the plans and specifications provided to it
by the Army ... would seriously impair the governments [sic]
ability to formulate policy and make judgments pursuant to its
war powers. The Government is the agency charged with the re-
sponsibility of deciding the nature and type of military equip-
ment that best suits its needs, not a manufacturer .... "I
3. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON GOVERNMENT DISCRETIONARY
AUTHORITY
History documents the importance of unimpaired government
discretion in wartime. 16 Beginning in 1942, scientists participating
in the Manhattan Project " worked to harness the atom in a
bomb."' Although they conducted one test in the New Mexico de-
161. Sanner, 144 N.J. Super. at 9, 364 A.2d at 47. Holding a contractor liable even
though it followed the contract specifications might suggest that the government acted im-
properly in commissioning the work. These doubts about the government's management of a
program-particularly a military activity-are precisely the type of second-guessing that
Dalehite seeks to prevent. Presumably, the government manages the war effort in a manner
consistent with the best interests of all concerned. Once the government becomes reluctant
to solicit contractors to manufacture ordnance pursuant to contracts of varying degrees of
specificity, its management capability suffers. See Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518,
520.(4th Cir. 1949), afl'd sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
162. Congress has the power to take actions during wartime that might otherwise be
unconstitutional. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 11, 12, 18. This is particularly true with
respect to commercial rights. See Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 754 (1948) (uphold-
ing recovery of excess profits under Renegotiation Act); Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333
U.S. 138, 144 (1948) (upholding postwar rent control); United States v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 305 (1941) (upholding Congress's power to compel businesses to cooper-
ate with the war effort). Although courts are less willing to sacrifice private rights for the
war effort, their willingness to do so increases in proportion to the perceived threat to na-
tional security. Compare Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding conviction
of Communist Party leaders for advocating the overthrow of the American government) and
Knauf v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (refusing to reconsider decision preventing
Czechoslovakian war bride from entering the United States) and Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (order excluding persons of Japanese ancestry from West Coast
military area during World War II held constitutional) and Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1
(1942) (upholding trial of Nazi saboteurs before a military commission) with Keegan v.
United States, 325 U.S. 478 (1§45) (reversing conspiracy convictions of German-American
Bund members) and State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (public schools
cannot compel Jehovah's Witnesses to salute American flag).
163. In 1942 the United States Army Corps of Engineers established the Manhattan
Project to administer the various scientific and industrial groups responsible for atomic re-
search. See ScIErrIFIC AMERICAN, ARMS CONTROL 3 (1973).
164. In 1938 German scientists discovered nuclear fission. Within a year Albert Ein-
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sert before dropping the bomb on Japan,""5 President Truman and
his advisers were unsure whether the bomb would work in com-
bat."' Some of his advisers lobbied for a noncombat demonstra-
tion of the bomb's potency rather than its use against Japan.I"
Although uncertain of the result, the United States proceeded to
drop the atomic bomb on Japan because of the necessities of mili-
tary strategy.' 58
Although the consequences of failure were less significant,
Agent Orange's background and use is not very different. The
French had unsuccessfully defended Vietnam against insurgents
for many years, and their departure from the region left a political
vacuum that the United States feared would be filled by the Com-
munists.'69 To prevent an unfriendly government from assuming
power in South Vietnam, President Kennedy in 1961 ordered
16,732 American military advisers to the region to assist the South
Vietnamese Army in its struggle with the enemy. 17 0 Matched
against an opponent that resorted to guerrilla tactics, the United
States military elected within a year to use Agent Orange to take
away the enemy's sanctuary: the dense forests.'7 ' Given the inabil-
ity of South Vietnam to defend itself, 7 ' and the political inadvisa-
bility of deploying American troops in the area,'7 the use of the
herbicide was an acceptable option. For these reasons, the military
stein recognized the tremendous military possibilities inherent in the new discovery and
sent a letter to President Roosevelt urging the United States to start a nuclear weapons
program. Following a favorable report by the National Academy of Sciences and informa-
tion from the British concerning their work in the field, the United States decided to con-
duct an "all out" effort to build an atomic bomb on December 6, 1941, the day before the
Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor. Id. In December 1942, Enrico Fermi and his co-workers
achieved the first nuclear chain reaction. Three years passed, however, before the scientists
and engineers could drop a bomb in combat. Id. at 5.
165. M. AMRINE, THE GREAT DECISION 149-51, 164-66 (1959); R. DONOVAN, CONFLIcr
AND CIsIs 72-73 (1977).
166. M. AMRINE, aupra note 165, at 161; R. DONOVAN, supra note 165, at 71.
167. R. DONOVAN, supra note 165, at 66-71.
168. Id. at 66, 70, 97.
169. T. WHITE, IN SEARCH OF HISTORY 332, 345-46 (1978).
170. Id. at 530.
171. See S. HERSH, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 144-87 (1968); A.V. THOMAS &
A.J. THOMAS, JR., LEGAL LIMrrs ON THE USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 150, 294
n.102 (1970); D'Amato, Gould & Woods, War Crimes and Vietnam: The "Nuremberg De-
fense" and the Military Service Resister, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 1055, 1095-96 (1969); O'Brien,
The Law of War, Command Responsibility and Vietnam, 60 GEo. L.J. 605, 644 (1972).
172. The United States elected to withdraw its troops from Vietnam-a program
known as "Vietnamization"-because of the political advantages, not the military prowess
of the South Vietnamese Army. H. KISSINGER, WHrrE HOUSE YEARS 271-77 (1979).
173. T. WHITE, supra note 169, at 346.
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ordered the manufacture of large quantities of Agent Orange, a
chemical whose physical properties and physiological effects were
relatively unknown.
1 74
Although it is now clear that the chemical companies' willing-
ness to produce Agent Orange did not affect the outcome of the
Vietnam War, the same cannot be said for those who participated
in the Manhattan Project. Unfortunately, military prognosticators
cannot foretell whether a weapon will influence the outcome of a
conflict. What the Manhattan Project and the history of Agent Or-
ange have in common, however, is that when military necessity re-
quires, the government will turn to a contractor for assistance and
quick results. A manufacturer's unwillingness to participate or be
innovative could present serious limitations on American military
strategy and emasculate the government's discretionary authority.
Immunizing the government contractor from products liability
during wartime does not mean that conduct that would amount to
a tort on the part of nonmilitary manufacturers is not still tortious
in character. Indeed, today the arms race between the United
States and the Soviet Union, a war of only words and numbers, has
produced a permanent munitions industry whose conduct should
be monitored by tort law; costs, time, and quality control are man-
ageable and can be reasonably reflected in the weapon's price.17 5
But during wartime, when the government requires the production
of a weapon quickly at the expense of quality control, the contrac-
tor deserves immunity from liability to ensure that it remains a
174. During World War II, the Army tested two herbicides to determine their effective-
ness in limiting the enemy's crop production. These two phenoxy compounds included 2, 4-
D (2, 4-dichlorophenoxy acetic acid) and 2, 4, 5-T (2, 4, 5-trichlorophenoxy acetic acid).
Agent Orange, named for the orange stripe around its canister, was a mixture of these two
chemicals. Following the war, the world agricultural community used herbicides to control
weeds. Spurred on by the successful application of herbicides during the 1950's, the military
resumed testing of the chemicals to ascertain their military usefulness. Similar success in
this limited operation prompted the United States government to begin aerial spraying of
the herbicides in Vietnam in early 1962. The military defoliated nearly ten per cent of
South Vietnam, using a solution of Agent Orange that was ten times stronger than that
allowed by the United States government for domestic agricultural use at that time.
The Department of Defense reviewed annually the efficacy of using Agent Orange in
Vietnam. A 1967 study commissioned by the Department concluded that Agent Orange,
while lethal to plants, probably did not pose any problems to humans. This view remained
unchanged until a 1970 Department of Agriculture study revealed that Agent Orange caused
birth defects among laboratory animals. In 1970, following this study and other reports link-
ing 2,4,5-T to human birth defects, the Department of Defense suspended all use of Agent
Orange in Vietnam. See Meyers, supra note 3, at 160-67; Commentary, supra note 3, at 138-
49; Comment, supra note 2, at 49-55.
175. See Dix & Riddell, supra note 72; Hudock, supra note 72; Kerr, supra note 72.
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part of the war effort.
C. The Unique Policy Considerations of Wartime
1. THE EXIGENCIES OF WARTIME AND INDIVIIDUAL RIGHTS
Courts that criticize the application of the government con-
tract defense in products liability cases discount the importance of
both the government's specifications and the exigencies of war.
They contend that "the public interest in human life and health"
should be of paramount concern because the contractor operates
only for his own benefit. 171 One commentator suggests that the
only way to make the manufacturer "act in the public interest [is]
by a strict accounting under products liability law.
'17
7
Admittedly, the government contractor's actions are motivated
by private, profitmaking concerns. But the supporters of tradi-
tional products liability fail to recognize that absent the govern-
ment actually "drafting" a business for the war effort, free market
forces still remain in wartime to govern contractual relation-
ships .1 78 To suppose that a manufacturer would support the war
effort by undertaking a project that threatens financial ruin be-
cause of products liability defies logic.
On an emotional level, however, ordering a soldier to risk his
life in war and requiring a contractor merely to limit its profits (if
it elects to contract with the government) appears unjust. Indeed,
if the soldier has the duty to serve, then in fairness he should have
the corresponding right to hold a manufacturer accountable for in-
juries caused by its product. But this Hohfeldian scheme is not
legally justified. When the government calls its citizens to arms, 1 7
176. Foster v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 502 F.2d 867, 871 (8th Cir. 1974); see Chal-
loner v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 512 F.2d 77, 84 (5th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 423
U.S. 3 (1975); cf. Lenherr v. NRM Corp., 504 F. Supp. 165, 173 (D. Kan. 1980) (design of
potentially dangerous machine by private manufacturer).
177. Davis, supra note 8, at 50.
178. An efficient industrial complex is essential to a properly functioning military force.
See supra note 75.
179. The government has the right to expect its citizens to honor their duty to serve the
country. In exchange for the right to enjoy the nation's resources, to participate in its deci-
sions, and to earn a comfortable wage, the citizenry is obligated to serve the government in
time of war. M. WALZER, OBLIGATIONS 82 (1970); see also Selective Draft Law Cases, 245
U.S. 366, 378 (1918) ("It may not be doubted that the very conception of a just government
and its duty to the citizen includes the reciprocal obligation of the citizen to render military
service in case of need and the right to compel it."). The citizen's duty, although in part
moral, is made legal by the draft. See Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 763-66 (1948);
Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. at 368-69; United States v. Sugar, 243 F. 423, 436-37
(E.D. Mich. 1917).
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as is its discretionary right 80 it presumably is acting in the na-
tional interest. Under these circumstances, individual sacrifice
sometimes is necessary for the good of the country."' 1 A person
who elects to enlist or is drafted to serve in the armed forces has
little choice other than to trust the government to act in the best
interests of the country. Thus, when the government orders the
manufacture of a weapon that might pose a danger to its own
soldiers, the presumption is that the decision is in the national
interest.
The above analysis presupposes that for purposes of the gov-
ernment contract defense, the United States is embroiled in a war.
Indeed, the exigencies of war and the attendant difficulties of
quick production and quality control are the very factors that dis-
tinguish the legal liability of a wartime contractor from his peace-
time counterpart. The government contract defense is valid, al-
though slightly more problematic, when the government is engaged
in an undeclared war or military exercise. The defense is more dif-
ficult to accept because the country lacks the sense of urgency that
characterizes a call to arms. 182 Relevant to the government con-
tract defense, however, is not the perceived national threat, but the
need for government discretion to coordinate any military exercise
and the limitations imposed on a contractor's ability to police his
work and control his costs. Taken to its logical conclusion, this
analysis suggests that a contractor manufacturing munitions for
the government in peacetime, although not faced with the same
production problems as a wartime contractor, may escape products
liability.
2. PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE RULES OF WAR
Once the threat of products liability alters the government de-
cision to deploy a weapon, tort law, rather than government judg-
ment, shapes military strategy. This unilateral restriction on the
180. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
181. Although the government has broad discretionary powers, it still must act in the
best interest of the citizenry. Occasionally, citizens may suffer at the expense of a govern-
ment decision. According to one school of thought, if that decision affects the nation's war-
time posture, then some sacrifice of the citizenry is expected because what is best for the
citizen in war probably is what is best for the state. M. WALZER, supra note 179, at 82.
182. The sense of national urgency that existed during World War II was not similar to
the attitude extant during the Vietnam War. In the 1940's, the entire nation rallied to sup-
port the war effort; in contrast to this sense of national unity, there was considerable public
opposition to the American involvement in the Vietnam War (although more than half of
the public approved of the war until 1966). 3 THE GALLUP POLL 2006 (1972).
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use of weapons is philosophically inconsistent with the rules of
war.
The annals of history are replete with examples of man's at-
tempts to limit, as well as to rationalize, the devastation of war.
During the Middle Ages, nations banned certain weapons from use,
including the crossbow, arbalest,5 S3  harquebus, 184 musket, and
poison gas. 185 Warriors considered battle partly agonistic and
partly juristic. 186 Nations viewed war as "just" if "waged by a legit-
imate authority, for a cause in and of itself . . . good.' 8 7 By the
seventeenth century, the impact of war on civilians had become
more widespread. Some jurists argued that "the economic activities
of civilians, in so far as they made possible the belligerent acts of
governments, were a perfectly legitimate target for military activ-
ity." '88 Although Dutch statesman Hugo Grotius forcefully argued
for constraints on the conduct of war,"8 9 his pleas were largely ig-
nored. The eighteenth century proved no different, as the scope of
war continued to expand.'90 As the potential for destruction in-
creased with the approach of the twentieth century, the concept of
a "just war" re-emerged. Governments attempted to accomodate
the necessities of warfare to the ethical imperatives of the state.
Nations drew up new conventions in an attempt to limit or "out-
law" war, and to create a jus contra bellum.'9' But the advent of
183. An arbalest is "a powerful medieval crossbow with a steel bow, bent by a special
attachment and shooting arrows, balls, or stones." WORLD BOOK DICTIONARY 108 (C. Barn-
hart ed. 1970).
184. A harquebus is "an old form of portable gun, provided at first with a matchlock,
afterwards with a wheel lock, used before muskets were invented." Id. at 958.
185. H. MAINE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 138-40 (2d ed. 1894).
186. M. HOWARD, RESTRAINTS ON WAR 5 (1979); see Paust, My Lai and Vietnam:
Norms, Myths and Leader Responsibility, 57 MIL. L. REV. 99, 109 (1972).
187. M. HOWARD, supra note 186, at 8.
188. Id. at 9.
189. See id. at 4-5; 1 THE LAW OF WAR 16-122 (L. Friedman ed. 1972).
190. Danto, On Moral Codes and Modern War, 45 Soc. RESEARCH 176, 178 (1978).
191. Examples of laws against war include: Convention for the Amelioration of the Con-
ditions of the Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2074, T.S.
No. 847, 118 L.N.T.S. 303; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July
27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021, T.S. No. 846, ?18 L.N.T.S. 343; Kellogg-Briand Pact, Aug. 27, 1928,
46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 L.N.T.S. 57; Convention for the Adaptation to Maritime
Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2371, T.S. No.
543; Convention Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2351, T.S. No. 542; Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers
and Persons in Case of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, T.S. No. 540; Convention
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No.
539; Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2259, T.S. No.
538; Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32
Stat. 1803, T.S.-No. 403; Declaration of Brussels, Mar. 19, 1874, United States-Belgium, 18
[Vol. 36:489
THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACT DEFENSE
nuclear weapons and neutron bombs render meaningless most of
these efforts.192
Today, governments have adopted some restrictions on war-
fare.155 These agreements establish either general principles gov-
erning unspecified categories of weapons or restraints on the use of
specific weapons.19' These limitations are supported by the realiza-
tion that a conflict so destructive as to leave no spoils for the victor
is senseless and amoral.
The lesson here, although facially obvious, is that war is not a
game with clearly demarcated lines and specific rules. In a game
there are restrictions imposed on the participants to give each side
an even chance of winning. But war is neither a game nor fair, be-
cause in war "[e]ach side is rather expected to do anything which
biases the outcome in its favor. . . .[War] is a license for violence,
and anything [short of a war crime] that contributes to victory is
legitimate."1 95
Absent a bilateral limitation on the use of force, such as inter-
nationally ratified prohibitions on war crimes,196 a country's unilat-
eral restriction on its use of force "biases the outcome" in its oppo-
nent's favor. 9 ' This is not to suggest that every unilateral
restriction on the manner of fighting is inappropriate. If the bur-
den of deploying a weapon outweighs the attendant benefits, then
withdrawal of the weapon system is justified. Moreover, to the ex-
tent that a weapon is morally unjustifiable (e.g., a weapon that
threatens the extermination of civilian life), "our Nation has a
duty to mankind to help obtain [the weapon's] effective
prohibition." 9 8
Stat. 804, T.S. No. 27; and Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded on the Field of Battle (Red Cross Convention), Aug. 22, 1864, 22 Stat. 940, T.S.
No. 377.
192. Nuclear weapon systems have become distinct from previous weapon systems in
that each nation's warheads, if used, are as dangerous to that nation as to the enemy.
193. E.g., Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, May 26, 1972, United States-U.S.S.R., 23
U.S.T. 3642, T.I.A.S. No. 7504 (SALT. I).
194. THE NEW HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 161 (A. Cassese ed. 1979). Gen-
eral prohibitions include ambiguous rules calling either for restrictions on arms or for spar-
ing civilian populations as much as possible "from the horrors of war." Id. at 161, 163. Other
rules specifically ban the use of particular weapons (e.g., projectiles of a specific weight or
poisonous gases). Id. at 168-70.
195. Danto, supra note 190, at 184.
196. Bilateral limitations restrain the use of the same force on both sides, thereby giv-
ing neither participant an advantage.
197. Danto, supra note 190, at 184. This assumes that the enemy will not impose the
same restrictions.
198. Moore, Ratification of the Geneva Protocol on Gas and Bacteriological Warfare:
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Every nation establishes its own criteria for justifying the use
of a weapon in war. Those who support the use of products liabil-
ity law to govern the conduct of government contractors suggest
that normative moral and legal values should be one criterion: Any
weapon whose performance capabilities and consequences cannot
be warranted by the contractor itself should not be deployed. Un-
fortunately, acceptance of this view improvidently restricts the
government's management of a military exercise and places the
fighting forces at a disadvantage.
IV. CONCLUSION
Broadly perceived, Agent Orange requires us to address the
moral propriety of the government's decision to order the manu-
facture and use of the herbicide Agent Orange in Vietnam. Some
might suggest that decisions of this sort are acceptable if consis-
tent with the "national interest." This rationalization could be jus-
tified given the difficulties posed by the dense forests of Vietnam
and the military purpose served by their defoliation. But if one
subscribes to the view that it is also in the "national interest" for
the government to protect its servicemen, then the decision to use
Agent Orange is not morally justifiable, especially if there existed
less dangerous alternatives.
A Legal and Political Analysis, 58 VA. L. REV. 419, 426 (1972). "War is cruel at best, but
the use of an instrument of death, which, once launched, cannot be controlled, and which
may decimate noncombatants-women and children-reduces civilization to savages." F.
BROWN, CHEMICAL WARFARE 41 (1968) (quoting General Peyton March, Chief of Staff of the
United States Army, 1932).
One commentator suggests that the United States' use of Agent Orange in Vietnam
constitutes a war crime:
The crop destruction program in Vietnam . ..may have sometimes exceeded
the limits imposed by customary international law in inadequately differentiat-
ing in the field between crops intended for civilian and those intended for mili-
tary use. . . .[A]t a minimum [international law] prohibits destruction of crops
intended solely for consumption by noncombatants and it may prohibit destruc-
tion unless the crops are intended solely for combatant use.
Moore, supra, at 477 n.201, (footnote omitted). Interpretation of the Geneva Gas Protocol,
June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, T.I.A.S. No. 8061, 94 L.N.T.S. 65, and United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 2603A, 12 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30), at 16, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969),
determine the guilt of the United States as a matter of international law. Moore, supra, at
477-78; O'Brien, supra note 171, at 644. The United States has contended that the prohibi-
tions of the Protocol and the Resolution do not include herbicides or "riot-control agents."
Moore, supra, at 445-47.
If the United States did commit a war crime in spraying Agent Orange in Vietnam,
then servicemen who participated in the project may also be guilty of war crimes unless the
order to defoliate is judged not to be clearly illegal on its face. Daniel, The Defense of
Superior Orders, 7 U. RICH. L. REv. 477, 485, 496-97 (1973).
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The Agent Orange court is not burdened with having to re-
solve these moral questions. Rather, the focus of its inquiry is on
the contractor's performance of the government contract. To de-
termine the contractor's legal responsibility, the court must con-
sider the nature of the contract specifications and the level of
knowledge of the contractor and the government. As a general pro-
position, the government contract defense correctly recognizes that
the contractor will not be held accountable for the consequences of
properly performing a contract, providing that the contractor ei-
ther did not know, or shared with the government the knowledge,
that the procured product was dangerous. The rule is based on
principles of warranty law;199 its theoretical underpinnings are
grounded in basic notions of sovereign immunity.
The government contract rule is justified because the govern-
ment's discretionary authority to contract should remain unen-
cumbered, especially in times of war. A decision to the contrary
would be repugnant to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which
recognizes that the government should be free to exercise a discre-
tionary function, such as a procurement decision, without the
threat of being held accountable under products liability. This im-
munity "extends" to a government contractor because he is merely
carrying out the will of the sovereign.
The potential liability of the manufacturers of Agent Orange
for injuries sustained by servicemen and civilians will not be re-
solved until numerous facts are clarified. Among the most impor-
tant questions still unanswered is whether the chemical companies
and the government knew, or should have known, about the dan-
gers of Agent Orange. If the chemical companies prevail on these
and other factual inquiries, then they should be absolved from lia-
bility under the government contract defense. In that event, the
plaintiffs' inability to obtain compensation for their injuries will be
due to Congress's inexplicable reluctance to enact a special bill to
help the victims of Agent Orange.20 0 Alternatively, the district
199. In delineating and explaining the elements of the government contract defense,
the district court in Agent Orange H failed to cite a single contract or warranty law case.
200. For its part, the Supreme Court has invited Congress to correct this injustice. See
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 138 (1950). Without the aid of special legislation, the
injured veterans have been forced to rely on existing compensation benefits, supra note 103,
and the aid of the Veterans Administration. In 1978 the VA started examining more than
89,000 Vietnam veterans who feared adverse health effects from exposure to Agent Orange.
Unfortunately, the VA program is plagued with problems. The General Accounting Office
has charged the VA with failing to conduct thorough medical examinations of veterans ex-
posed to herbicides. The report also accused the VA of using inconsistent testing procedures
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court should find the manufacturers liable if they fail to prove each
of the elements of the government contract defense.
Until the factual disputes in Agent Orange are settled, the lia-
bility of the chemical companies will remain unclear. What is un-
mistakably clear is that the infirmities of the servicemen and civil-
ians who were exposed to Agent Orange remain a poignant
epilogue to a tragic war.
WILLIAM J. BLECHMAN
and failing to properly inform the veterans of the dangers of the herbicide either before or
after completion of the examinations. Miami Herald, Oct. 26, 1982, at A6, col. 1.
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